

# **INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ISO/IEC 9594-8:2005** TECHNICAL CORRIGENDUM 4

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# Information technology — Open Systems Interconnection — The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate frame. TECHNICAL CORDICE The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks

Technologies de l'information — Interconnexion de systèmes ouverts (QSf) L'annuaire: Cadre général des certificats de clé publique et d'attribut

RECTIFICATIF TECHNIQUE 4

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## INTERNATIONAL STANDARD

## RECOMMENDATION ITU-T

# Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks

## **Technical Corrigendum 4**

15011EC 9594.8:20051Cor A:2012 (covering resolution to defect reports 353, 362, 365, 366, 368, 369, 372 and 373)

#### 1) Correction of the defects reported in defect report 353

*In Annex A, replace the definition for CertificatePair data type with:* 

```
CertificatePair ::= SEQUENCE {
  issuedToThisCA [0] Certificate OPTIONAL,
  issuedByThisCA [1] Certificate OPTIONAL }
  (WITH COMPONENTS { ..., issuedToThisCA PRESENT} |
  WITH COMPONENTS { ..., issuedByThisCA PRESENT})
```

#### Correction of the defects reported in defect report 362 2)

Add clause 2.3 as follows:

#### 2.3 Recommendations

ITU-T Recommendation X.1252 (2010), Baseline identity management terms and definitions.

Insert the following new clause 3.2 after clause 3.1 and renumber subsequent clauses accordingly:

#### Baseline identity management terms and definitions 3.2

The following term is defined in Rec. ITU-T X.1252:

trust: The firm belief in the reliability and truth of information or in the ability and disposition of an entity to act appropriately, within a specified context.

Delete the 'trust' definition from clause 3.3 (now clause 3.4) and renumber subsequent clauses accordingly.

For consistency purposes, modify the first paragraph of clause 18.2.1, Obtaining public-key certificates from the directory, as shown:

Certificates are held within directory entries as attributes of type UserCertificate, CACertificate and CrossCertificatePair. These attribute types are known to the Directory. These attributes can be operated on using the same protocol operations as other attributes. The definition of these types can be found in clause 33.3; the specification of these attribute types is defined in clause 11.2.

#### Correction of the defects reported in defect report 365 3)

*Update the definition for end-entity as shown:* 

3.34.27 end-entity: Either a public-key certificate subject that uses its private key for purposes other than signing certificates, or an attribute certificate holder that uses its attributes to gain access to a resource, or an entity that is a relying party.

# 4) Correction of the defects reported in defect report 366

In clause 7, replace the text for the issuer field to:

The issuer field shall hold the distinguished name of the CA that issued the public-key certificate. It shall hold a non-empty distinguished name.

*In clause 7, replace the text for the subject field to:* 

The **subject** field shall identify the entity associated with the public-key found in the **subjectPublicKey** component of the **subjectPublicKeyInfo** field. If the public-key certificate is for an end-entity, then the distinguished name may be an empty sequence providing that the **subjectAltName** extension is present and flagged as critical. Otherwise, it shall be a non-empty distinguished name (see 8.3.2.1).

Change NOTE 2 in clause 8.3.2.1 as shown

NOTE 2 – If this extension field is present and is flagged critical, the **subject** field of the an end-entity public-key certificate may contain a null name (e.g., a sequence of zero relative distinguished names) in which case the subject is identified only by the name or names in this extension.

Delete the NOTE in clause 8.3.2.2.

# 5) Correction of the defects reported in defect report 368

Update the first paragraph of clause 6 as shown:

This <u>Directory</u> Specification defines a framework for obtaining and trusting a public key of an entity in order to encrypt information to be decrypted by that entity, or in order to verify the digital signature of that entity. The framework includes the issuance of a public-key certificate by a Certification Authority (CA) and the validation of that <u>public-key</u> certificate by the <u>certificate user</u> <u>relying party</u>, i.e., the entity relying on the content of the <u>public-key</u> certificate. The validation includes:

establishing a trusted path of <u>public-key</u> certificates between <u>a trusted entity called a trust anchor</u> -the <u>certificate user</u> and the <u>public-key</u> certificate <u>subject</u>, i.e., the entity for which the <u>public-key</u> certificate has been issued;

# 6) Correction of the defects reported in defect report 369

Replace the definition for certification path with

**3.34.19 certification path**: An ordered list of one or more public-key certificates, starting with a public-key certificate signed by the trust anchor, and ending with the public key certificate to be validated. All intermediate public-key certificates, if any, are CA-certificates in which the subject of the preceding certificate is the issuer of the following certificate.

# 7) Correction of the defects reported in defect report 372

In clause 8.4.2.3 and Annex A, update the PolicyConstraintsSyntax as shown:

```
PolicyConstraintsSyntax ::= SEQUENCE {
   requireExplicitPolicy [0] SkipCerts OPTIONAL,
   inhibitPolicyMapping [1] SkipCerts OPTIONAL,
   ...

   (WITH COMPONENTS {..., requireExplicitPolicy PRESENT } |
   WITH COMPONENTS {..., inhibitPolicyMapping PRESENT } )
```

Add a new paragraph right under the ASN1:

At least one of the requireExplicitPolicy and inhibitPolicyMapping components shall be present.