
**Identification cards — Integrated circuit
cards with contacts —**

**Part 15:
Cryptographic information application**

Cartes d'identification — Cartes à circuit intégré à contacts —

Partie 15: Application des informations cryptographiques



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Contents

Page

Foreword	iv
Introduction	v
1 Scope	1
2 Normative references	2
3 Terms and definitions	2
4 Symbols and abbreviated terms	5
4.1 Symbols	5
4.2 Abbreviated terms	6
5 Conventions	7
6 Cryptographic information objects	7
6.1 Introduction	7
6.2 CIO classes	7
6.3 Attributes	8
6.4 Access restrictions	8
7 CIO files	8
7.1 Overview	8
7.2 IC card requirements	8
7.3 Card file structure	9
7.4 EF.DIR	9
7.5 Contents of DF.CIA	10
8 Information syntax in ASN.1	13
8.1 Guidelines and encoding conventions	13
8.2 Basic ASN.1 defined types	13
8.3 The CIOChoice type	22
8.4 Private key information objects	23
8.6 Secret key information objects	27
8.7 Certificate information objects	27
8.8 Data container information objects	30
8.9 Authentication information objects	31
8.10 The cryptographic information file, EF.CIAInfo	35
Annex A (normative) ASN.1 module	38
Annex B (informative) CIA example for cards with digital signature and authentication functionality	52
Annex C (informative) Example topologies	55
Annex D (informative) Examples of CIO values and their encodings	57
Bibliography	70

Foreword

ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) and IEC (the International Electrotechnical Commission) form the specialized system for worldwide standardization. National bodies that are members of ISO or IEC participate in the development of International Standards through technical committees established by the respective organization to deal with particular fields of technical activity. ISO and IEC technical committees collaborate in fields of mutual interest. Other international organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO and IEC, also take part in the work. In the field of information technology, ISO and IEC have established a joint technical committee, ISO/IEC JTC 1.

International Standards are drafted in accordance with the rules given in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.

The main task of the joint technical committee is to prepare International Standards. Draft International Standards adopted by the joint technical committee are circulated to national bodies for voting. Publication as an International Standard requires approval by at least 75 % of the national bodies casting a vote.

Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent rights. ISO and IEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.

ISO/IEC 7816-15 was prepared by Joint Technical Committee ISO/IEC JTC 1, *Information technology*, Subcommittee SC 17, *Cards and personal identification*.

ISO/IEC 7816 consists of the following parts, under the general title *Identification cards — Integrated circuit cards with contacts*:

- *Part 1: Physical characteristics*
- *Part 2: Dimensions and location of the contacts*
- *Part 3: Electronic signals and transmission protocols*
- *Part 4: Organisation, security and commands for interchange*
- *Part 5: Registration of application providers*
- *Part 6: Interindustry data elements for interchange*
- *Part 7: Interindustry commands for Structured Card Query Language (SCQL)*
- *Part 8: Commands for security operations*
- *Part 9: Commands for card management*
- *Part 10: Electronic signals and answer to reset for synchronous cards*
- *Part 11: Personal verification through biometric methods*
- *Part 15: Cryptographic information application*

Introduction

Integrated circuit cards with cryptographic functions can be used for secure identification of users of information systems as well as for other core security services such as non-repudiation with digital signatures and distribution of enciphering keys for confidentiality. The objective of this part of ISO/IEC 7816 is to provide a framework for such services based on available international standards. A main goal has been to provide a solution that may be used in large-scale systems with several issuers of compatible cards, providing for international interchange. It is flexible enough to allow for many different environments, while still preserving the requirements for interoperability.

A number of data structures have been provided to manage private keys and key fragments, to support a public key certificate infrastructure and flexible management of user and entity authentication.

This part of ISO/IEC 7816 is based on PKCS #15 v1.1 (see the bibliography). The relationship between these documents is as follows:

- a common core is identical in both documents;
- those components of PKCS #15 which do not relate to IC cards have been removed;
- this part of ISO/IEC 7816 includes enhancements to meet specific IC card requirements.

Identification cards — Integrated circuit cards with contacts —

Part 15:

Cryptographic information application

1 Scope

This part of ISO/IEC 7816 specifies an application in a card. This application contains information on cryptographic functionality. This part of ISO/IEC 7816 defines a common syntax and format for the cryptographic information and mechanisms to share this information whenever appropriate.

The objectives of this part of ISO/IEC 7816 are to:

- facilitate interoperability among components running on various platforms (platform neutral);
- enable applications in the outside world to take advantage of products and components from multiple manufacturers (vendor neutral);
- enable the use of advances in technology without rewriting application-level software (application neutral); and
- maintain consistency with existing, related standards while expanding upon them only where necessary and practical.

It supports the following capabilities:

- storage of multiple instances of cryptographic information in a card;
- use of the cryptographic information;
- retrieval of the cryptographic information, a key factor for this is the notion of “Directory Files”, which provides a layer of indirection between objects on the card and the actual format of these objects;
- cross-referencing of the cryptographic information with DOs defined in other parts of ISO/IEC 7816 when appropriate;
- different authentication mechanisms; and
- multiple cryptographic algorithms (the suitability of these is outside the scope of this part of ISO/IEC 7816).

This part of ISO/IEC 7816 does not cover the internal implementation within the card and/or the outside world. It shall not be mandatory for implementations complying with this International Standard to support all options described.

In case of discrepancies between ASN.1 definitions in the body of the text and the module in Annex A, Annex A takes precedence.

2 Normative references

The following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

ISO/IEC 7816 (all parts), *Identification cards — Integrated circuit cards with contacts*

ISO/IEC 8824-1:1998, *Information technology — Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation*

ISO/IEC 8824-2:1998, *Information technology — Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Information object specification*

ISO/IEC 8824-3:1998, *Information technology — Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Constraint specification*

ISO/IEC 8824-4:1998, *Information technology — Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Parameterization of ASN.1 specifications*

ISO/IEC 8825-1:1998, *Information technology — ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)*

ISO 9564-1:2002, *Banking — Personal Identification Number (PIN) management and security — Part 1: Basic principles and requirements for online PIN handling in ATM and POS systems*

ISO/IEC 9594-8:1998, *Information technology — Open Systems Interconnection — The Directory: Authentication framework*

ISO/IEC 10646-1:2000, *Information technology — Universal Multiple-Octet Coded Character Set (UCS) — Part 1: Architecture and Basic Multilingual Plane*

ANSI X9.42-2001, *Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: Agreement of Symmetric Keys Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography*

ANSI X9.62-1998, *Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)*

3 Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.

3.1

absolute path

path that starts with the file identifier '3F00'

3.2

application

data structures, data elements and program modules needed for performing a specific functionality

[ISO/IEC 7816-4]

3.3

application identifier

data element that identifies an application in a card

NOTE Adapted from ISO/IEC 7816-4.

3.4**application provider**

entity providing the components required for performing an application in the card

[ISO/IEC 7816-4]

3.5**authentication information object**

cryptographic information object that provides information about authentication related data, e.g. a password

3.6**authentication object directory file**

elementary file containing authentication information objects

3.7**binary coded decimal**

number representation where a number is expressed as a sequence of decimal digits and each decimal digit is encoded as a four bit binary number

3.8**cardholder**

person to whom the card was issued

3.9**card issuer**

organization or entity that issues cards

3.10**certificate directory file**

elementary file containing certificate information objects

3.11**certificate information object**

cryptographic information object that provides information about a certificate

3.12**command**

message that initiates an action and solicits a response from the card

3.13**cryptographic information application**

application in a card that contains information on cryptographic information objects, other security data elements and their intended use

3.14**cryptographic information object**

structured information contained in a CIA, which describes a cryptographic data element, e.g. a public key or a certificate

3.15**data container information object**

cryptographic information object that provides information about a data container, e.g. a file

3.16**data container object directory file**

elementary file containing data container information objects

3.17

dedicated file

structure containing file control information, and, optionally, memory available for allocation

[ISO/IEC 7816-4]

3.18

directory (DIR) file

optional elementary file containing a list of applications supported by the card and optional related data elements

[ISO/IEC 7816-4]

3.19

elementary file

set of data units or records or data objects sharing the same file identifier and the same security attribute(s)

[ISO/IEC 7816-4]

3.20

file identifier

data element (two bytes) used to address a file

[ISO/IEC 7816-4]

3.21

function

process accomplished by one or more commands and resultant actions

3.22

master file

unique dedicated file representing the root in a card using a hierarchy of dedicated files

[ISO/IEC 7816-4]

NOTE The MF has file identifier '3F00'.

3.23

message

string of bytes transmitted by the interface device to the card or vice versa, excluding transmission-oriented characters

3.24

object directory file

mandatory elementary file containing information about other CIA directory files

3.25

password

data that may be required by the application to be presented to the card by its user for authentication purpose

[ISO/IEC 7816-4]

3.26

path

concatenation of file identifiers without delimitation

[ISO/IEC 7816-4]

3.27**private key directory file**

elementary file containing private key information objects

3.28**private key information object**

cryptographic information object that provides information about a private key

3.29**provider**

authority who has or who obtained the right to create a dedicated file in the card

[ISO/IEC 7816-4]

3.30**public key directory file**

elementary file containing public key information objects

3.31**public key information object**

cryptographic information object that provides information about a public key

3.32**record**

string of bytes referenced and handled by the card within an elementary file of record structure

[ISO/IEC 7816-4]

3.33**relative path**

path that starts with the file identifier of the current DF

3.34**secret key directory file**

elementary file containing secret key information objects

3.35**secret key information object**

cryptographic information object that provides information about a secret key

3.36**template**

set of data objects forming the value field of a constructed data object

NOTE Adapted from ISO/IEC 7816-6.

4 Symbols and abbreviated terms

4.1 Symbols

DF.x Dedicated file x, where x is the acronym of the file

EF.x Elementary file x, where x is the acronym of the file

'0' – '9' and 'A' – 'F' Hexadecimal digits

4.2 Abbreviated terms

For the purposes of this document, the following abbreviations apply.

AID	Application identifier
AOD	Authentication object directory
BCD	Binary-coded decimal
CD	Certificate directory
CDE	Cryptographic data element
CIA	Cryptographic information application
CIO	Cryptographic information object
CV	Card-verifiable
DCOD	Data container object directory
DDO	Discretionary data object
DF	Dedicated file
DH	Diffie-Hellman
DSA	Digital Signature Algorithm
EC	Elliptic Curve
EF	Elementary file
IDO	Interindustry data object, as defined in ISO/IEC 7816-6
IFD	Interface device
KEA	Key Exchange Algorithm
MF	Master file
OD	Object directory
PKCS	Public-key cryptography standard
PrKD	Private key directory
PuKD	Public key directory
RSA	Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
SKD	Secret key directory
SPKI	Simple Public Key Infrastructure
UCS	Universal multiple-octet coded character set (see ISO/IEC 10646-1)
URL	Uniform resource locator

UTC	Coordinated universal time
UTF-8	UCS transformation format 8
WTLS	Wireless Application Protocol transport layer security

5 Conventions

This part of ISO/IEC 7816 presents ASN.1 notation in the **bold Helvetica** typeface. When ASN.1 types and values are referenced in normal text, they are differentiated from normal text by presenting them in the **bold Helvetica** typeface. The names of commands, typically referenced when specifying information exchanges between cards and IFDs, are differentiated from normal text by displaying them in `Courier`.

If the items in a list are numbered (as opposed to using “–” or letters), then the items shall be considered steps in a procedure.

6 Cryptographic information objects

6.1 Introduction

This part of ISO/IEC 7816 provides:

- descriptions of objects describing cryptographic information contained in the card;
- descriptions of the intended use of this information;
- ways to retrieve this information (when appropriate);
- an abstract syntax for the information which provides the basis for encodings; and
- an object model for the information.

The information, which also may include access control information, is described in the form of CIOs.

6.2 CIO classes

This part of ISO/IEC 7816 defines four classes of CIOs:

- cryptographic key information objects;
- certificate information objects;
- data container information objects; and
- authentication information objects.

The logical structure of these CIOs is shown in Figure 1. The object class of cryptographic key information objects has three subclasses: private key, secret key, and public key information objects. CIOs inherit attributes from higher-level classes, and may be instantiated on cards.




Figure 1 — CIO class hierarchy

6.3 Attributes

All CIOs have a number of attributes. Type specific attributes are always present. Group specific attributes and attributes common to all CIOs may be inherited as shown in Figure 2. Attributes are defined in Clause 8.




Figure 2 — Attribute inheritance concept

6.4 Access restrictions

CDEs can be private, meaning that they are protected against unauthorized access, or public. Access (read, write, etc.) to private CDEs is described by *Authentication Information Objects* (which also includes *Authentication Procedures*). Conditional access (from a cardholder's perspective) is achieved with knowledge-based user information, biometric user information, or cryptographic means. Public CDEs are not protected from read-access.

7 CIO files

7.1 Overview

A CIO is contained in an elementary file, and refers in general to a CDE; a CIO may in some cases contain the CDE directly. A dedicated file (DF.CIA) contains CIO elementary files. Certain CIO files may be present under other dedicated files, in which case they are referenced to from the DF.CIA.


7.2 IC card requirements

Cards shall comply with the appropriate parts of ISO/IEC 7816, when using:

- hierarchic logical file systems;
- direct or indirect application selection;
- access control mechanisms;
- read operations; and
- cryptographic operations.

7.3 Card file structure

A typical card supporting this part of ISO/IEC 7816 will have the following layout:



NOTE For the purpose of this part of ISO/IEC 7816, EF.DIR is only needed on cards that do not support application selection using AID as DF name as defined in ISO/IEC 7816-4 or when multiple CIAs reside on a single card.

Figure 3 — Example contents of DF.CIA

Other possible topologies are discussed in Annex C. The contents and purpose of each file and directory is described below.

7.4 EF.DIR

This file under the MF (file identifier: '2F00') shall, if present, contain one or several application templates as defined in ISO/IEC 7816-4. The application template (tag '61') for a CIA shall at least contain the following IDOs:

- Application Identifier (tag '4F'), value defined in 7.5.5
- Path (tag '51'), value supplied by application provider

Other IDOs from ISO/IEC 7816-4 may, at the application provider's discretion, be present as well. In particular, it is recommended that application providers include both the "Discretionary data objects" data object (tag '73') and the "Application label" data object (tag '50'). The application label shall contain an UTF-8 encoded label for the application, chosen by the application provider. The "Discretionary data objects" data object shall, if present, contain a DER-encoded (ISO/IEC 8825-1:1998) value of the ASN.1 type CIODDO:

```

CIODDO ::= SEQUENCE {
    providerId      OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
    odPath          Path OPTIONAL,
    ciaInfoPath     [0] Path OPTIONAL,
    aid             [APPLICATION 15] OCTET STRING (SIZE(1..16)),
                  (CONSTRAINED BY {-- Must be an AID in accordance with ISO/IEC 7816-4--})
                  OPTIONAL,
    ... -- For future extensions
} -- Context tag 1 is historical and shall not be used
  
```

NOTE 1 PKCS #15 uses this tag.

NOTE 2 In accordance with ISO/IEC 7816-4, and when present in an application template, the tag [APPLICATION 19] ('73') replaces the CIODDO SEQUENCE ('30') tag, due to implicit tagging. See D.8 for an example.

The **providerId** component, if present, shall contain an object identifier uniquely identifying the CIA provider. The **odfPath** and **ciaInfoPath** components shall, if present, contain paths to elementary files EF.OD and EF.CIAInfo respectively. This provides a way for issuers to use non-standard file identifiers for these files without sacrificing interoperability. It also provides card issuers with the opportunity to share CIAInfo files between CIAs, when several CIAs reside on one card. The **aid** component shall, if present, indicate the application to which this CIA applies.

The use of a DIR file will simplify application selection when several CIAs reside on one card. Its use is described in ISO/IEC 7816-4.

7.5 Contents of DF.CIA

7.5.1 Overview

Table 1 lists elementary (mandatory and optional) files in the DF.CIA, along with their reserved file identifiers. File types (linear record or transparent) are indicated in the last column.

Table 1 — Elementary files in DF.CIA

File	Mandatory	(Default) File Identifier	Short EF identifier	File type
CIAInfo	X	'5032'	'12'	Transparent
OD	X	'5031'	'11'	Linear record or transparent
AODs				Linear record or transparent
PrKDs				Linear record or transparent
PuKDs				Linear record or transparent
SKDs				Linear record or transparent
CDs				Linear record or transparent
DCODs				Linear record or transparent
—		'5033'		Reserved for historical reasons

7.5.2 The CIAInfo EF

The CIAInfo EF shall contain information about the card and its capabilities, pertaining to the use of CIOs. The following information shall always be present:

- version number; and
- card characteristics.

The following information may be found:

- CIA serial number;
- manufacturer identification;

- card label;
- allocated security environments;
- file structures;
- supported algorithms;
- issuer identification;
- holder authentication; and
- time of last update.

7.5.3 EF.OD

The Object Directory file (EF.OD) is an elementary file, which may contain references to other CIO EFs. Figure 4 shows the relationship between EF.OD and other CIO EFs (for reasons of simplicity, only one referenced file of each type is shown). The ASN.1 syntax for the contents of EF.OD is described in 8.3.




Figure 4 — Indirect retrieval of CIOs using EF.OD

7.5.4 CIO Directory files

Each CIO directory file contains CIOs of a certain kind:

- private key directory files contains private key information objects;
- public key directory files contains public key information objects;
- secret key directory files contains secret key information objects;
- certificate directory files contains certificate information objects;
- data container object directory files contains data container information objects; and
- authentication object directory files contains authentication information objects.

Multiple CIO directory files of the same kind may be present in a DF.CIA.

The object directory file EF.OD is unique and contains references to CIO directory files.

NOTE 1 If a CIO directory file of a certain kind exists in a DF.CIA, it will usually not be empty.


NOTE 2 CIO directory files may also be found in other DFs in the card.

NOTE 3 CIOs may be stored directly in an EF.OD (without any indirection), or in CIO directory files. CDEs may likewise be stored directly in CIOs or be referenced by them.

NOTE 4 The use of indirection simplifies personalization, allows for more flexible access rules, and is recommended.

When CIOs reference CDEs that are logically linked (e.g. a private key CIO and a corresponding public key CIO) the CDEs shall have the same CIO identifier.

Figure 5 describes the general structure of these files.



NOTE In the figure, the letter x stands for the kind of the information object which holds the information.

Figure 5 — Indirect retrieval of CDEs using CIOs

7.5.5 DF.CIA selection

The AID of a DF.CIA consists of two fields, the standard identifier E8 28 BD 08 0F (mandatory), optionally followed by either:

- a 1-byte index in the range '00' to '7F' followed by a proprietary application identifier extension (PIX); or
- a (possibly right-truncated) AID (e.g. of an application using this CIA) using a registered application provider identifier from registration category 'A' or 'D' (see ISO/IEC 7816-4).

The length of the AID must not exceed 16 bytes. The format of the AID is therefore:




Figure 6 — AID formats

DF.CIA may be selected using its AID by cards supporting direct application selection.

NOTE For historical reasons, DF.CIA may be selected using the AID: A0 00 00 00 63 50 4B 43 53 2D 31 35.

If direct application selection is not possible, an EF.DIR file with contents as specified in 7.4 shall be used.

When several DF.CIAs reside on one card, they may be distinguished by information in the application template in EF.DIR. It is recommended that the application label (tag '50') also be present to simplify the man-machine interface (e.g. vendor name in short form).

8 Information syntax in ASN.1

8.1 Guidelines and encoding conventions

This part of ISO/IEC 7816 uses ASN.1 (ISO/IEC 8824:1998, all parts) to describe CIOs. When stored in a card, DER-encoding of CIO values are assumed. Annex A contains a complete specification in ASN.1 of all CIOs; the text of this clause is explanatory only.

The contents of a CIO directory file is the concatenation of 0, 1 or more DER-encoded values of the same type, see e.g. Annex D.

8.2 Basic ASN.1 defined types

8.2.1 Identifier

Identifier ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE (0..cia-ub-identifier))

The **Identifier** type is used as a CIO identifier. For cross-reference purposes, two or more CIOs may have the same **Identifier** value. One example of this is a private key and one or more corresponding certificates.

8.2.2 Reference

Reference ::= INTEGER (0..cia-ub-reference)

This type is used for generic reference purposes.

8.2.3 Label

Label ::= UTF8String (SIZE(0..cia-ub-label))

This type is used for all labels (i.e. user assigned object names).

8.2.4 CredentialIdentifier

CredentialIdentifier {KEY-IDENTIFIER : IdentifierSet} ::= SEQUENCE {
 idType KEY-IDENTIFIER.&id ({IdentifierSet}),
 idValue KEY-IDENTIFIER.&Value ({IdentifierSet}{@idType})
}

KeyIdentifiers KEY-IDENTIFIER ::= {
 issuerAndSerialNumber |
 issuerAndSerialNumberHash |
 subjectKeyId |
 subjectKeyHash |
 issuerKeyHash |
 issuerNameHash |
 subjectNameHash |
 pgp2KeyId |
 openPGPKeyId,
 ...
}

KEY-IDENTIFIER ::= CLASS {
 &id INTEGER UNIQUE,
 &Value
} WITH SYNTAX {
 SYNTAX &Value IDENTIFIED BY &id
}

The **CredentialIdentifier** type is used to identify a particular key or certificate. There are currently nine members in the set of identifiers for private keys and certificates, **KeyIdentifiers**:

- **issuerAndSerialNumber**: The value of this type shall be a **SEQUENCE** consisting of the issuer's distinguished name and the serial number of a certificate which contains the public key associated with the private key.
- **issuerAndSerialNumberHash**: As for **issuerAndSerialNumber**, but the value is an **OCTET STRING** which contains a SHA-1 hash value of this information in order to preserve space.
- **subjectKeyId**: The value of this type shall be an **OCTET STRING** with the same value as the **subjectKeyIdentifier** certificate extension in a ISO/IEC 9594-8:1998 certificate which contains the public key associated with the private key. This identifier can be used for certificate chain traversals.
- **subjectKeyHash**: An **OCTET STRING** which contains the SHA-1 hash of the public key associated with the private key.
- **issuerKeyHash**: An **OCTET STRING** which contains the SHA-1 hash of the public key used to sign the requested certificate.
- **issuerNameHash**: An **OCTET STRING** that contains a SHA-1 hash of the issuer's name as it appears in the certificate.

NOTE This identifier may, in conjunction with the **subjectNameHash** identifier also be used for certificate chain construction.

- **subjectNameHash**: An **OCTET STRING** that contains a SHA-1 hash of the subject's name as it appears in the certificate.
- **pgp2KeyId**: An **OCTET STRING (SIZE(8))** that contains a PGP2 key identifier

NOTE PGP 2 key identifiers are defined in IETF RFC 2440 (see the bibliography).

- **openPGPKeyId**: An **OCTET STRING (SIZE (8))** that contains an OpenPGP key identifier

NOTE OpenPGP key identifiers are defined in IETF RFC 2440 (see the bibliography).

8.2.5 ReferencedValue and Path

```
ReferencedValue ::= CHOICE {
    path      Path,
    url       URL
} -- The syntax of the object is determined by the context
```

```
URL ::= CHOICE {
    url          CHOICE {printable PrintableString, ia5 IA5String},
    urlWithDigest [3] SEQUENCE {
        url      IA5String,
        digest    DigestInfoWithDefault
    }
}
```

```
Path ::= SEQUENCE {
    efidOrPath    OCTET STRING,
    index         INTEGER (0..cia-ub-index) OPTIONAL,
    length        [0] INTEGER (0..cia-ub-index) OPTIONAL
} (WITH COMPONENTS {..., index PRESENT, length PRESENT}
  WITH COMPONENTS {..., index ABSENT, length ABSENT})
```

A **ReferencedValue** is a reference to a CIO value of some kind. This can either be some external reference (captured by the **url** choice) or a reference to a file on the card (the **path** identifier). The syntax of the value is determined by the context.

In the **path** case, identifiers **index** and **length** may specify a specific location within the file. If the file is a linear record file, **index**, when present, shall specify the record number (in the ISO/IEC 7816-4 definition) and **length** can be set to 0 (if the card's operating system allows an L_e parameter equal to '00' in a 'READ RECORD' command). Lengths of fixed records may be found in the **CIAInfo** file as well (see 8.10). If the file is a transparent file, **index**, when present, shall specify an offset within the file, and **length** – the length of the segment (**index** would then become parameter P_1 and/or P_2 and **length** – the parameter L_e in a 'READ BINARY' command). By using **index** and **length**, several objects may be stored within the same transparent file.

NOTE From the above follows that a **length** of 0 indicates that the file pointed to by **efidOrPath** is a linear record file.

When **efidOrPath** is:

- empty, no file is referenced by it;
- one byte long, it references a short EF identifier in the most significant 5 bits (bits b3, b2 and b1 shall be set to 0);
- two bytes long, it references a file by its file identifier;
- longer than two bytes and consists of an even number of bytes, it references a file either by an absolute or relative path (i.e. concatenation of file identifiers);
- longer than two bytes and consists of an odd number of bytes, it references a qualified path (see ISO/IEC 7816-4).

In the **url** case, the URL may either be a simple URL or a URL in combination with a cryptographic hash of the object stored at the given location. Assuming that the CIO card is integrity-protected, the digest will protect the externally protected object as well.

NOTE The URL syntax is defined in IETF RFC 2396 (see the bibliography).

8.2.6 ObjectValue

```
ObjectValue { Type } ::= CHOICE {
    indirect ReferencedValue,
    direct   [0] Type,
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

An object value of type **ObjectValue** type shall, unless otherwise mentioned, be stored by indirect reference (i.e. by pointing to another location where the actual value resides).

8.2.7 PathOrObjects

```
PathOrObjects { ObjectType } ::= CHOICE {
    path      Path,
    objects   [0] SEQUENCE OF ObjectType,
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

The **PathOrObjects** type is used to reference sequences of objects residing either within the OD or in another file. If the **path** alternative is used the referenced file shall contain the concatenation of 0, 1 or more DER-encoded values of the given type. Any number of 'FF' octets may occur before, between or after the values without any meaning (i.e. as padding for unused space or deleted values). The **path** alternative is strongly recommended (see Note 4 in 7.5.4).

8.2.8 CommonObjectAttributes

NOTE This type is a container for attributes common to all CIOs.

```
CommonObjectAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    label          Label OPTIONAL,
    flags          CommonObjectFlags OPTIONAL,
    authId         Identifier OPTIONAL,
    userConsent    INTEGER (1..cia-ub-userConsent) OPTIONAL,
    accessControlRules SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AccessControlRule OPTIONAL,
    ...
} (CONSTRAINED BY {-- authId should be present if flags.private is set.
-- It shall equal an authId in one authentication object in the AOD -- })
```

```
CommonObjectFlags ::= BIT STRING {
    private      (0),
    modifiable   (1),
    internal      (2)
} -- Bit (2) is present for historical reasons and shall not be used
```

```
AccessControlRule ::= SEQUENCE {
    accessMode     AccessMode,
    securityCondition SecurityCondition,
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

```
AccessMode ::= BIT STRING {
    read      (0),
    update    (1),
    execute    (2),
    delete    (3)
}
```

```
SecurityCondition ::= CHOICE {
    always          NULL,
    authId          Identifier,
    authReference   AuthReference,
    not             [0] SecurityCondition,
    and             [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (2..cia-ub-securityConditions) OF SecurityCondition,
    or             [2] SEQUENCE SIZE (2..cia-ub-securityConditions) OF SecurityCondition,
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

```
AuthReference ::= SEQUENCE {
    authMethod      AuthMethod,
    seldentifier     Reference OPTIONAL
}
```

```
AuthMethod ::= BIT STRING {secureMessaging(0), extAuthentication(1), userAuthentication(2)}
```

The **label** is purely for display purposes (man-machine interface), for example when a user have several certificates for one key pair (e.g. "Bank certificate", "E-mail certificate").

The **flags** component indicates whether the particular object is private or not, and whether it is of type read-only or not. A **private** object may only be accessed after proper authentication (e.g. password verification). If an object is marked as **modifiable**, it should be possible to update the value of the object. If an object is both **private** and **modifiable**, updating is only allowed after successful authentication, however.

The **authId** component gives, in the case of a private object, a cross-reference back to the authentication object used to protect this object (For a description of authentication objects, see 8.9).

The **userConsent** component gives, in the case of a private object (or an object for which access conditions has been specified), the number of times an application may access the object without explicit consent from the user (e.g. a value of 3 indicates that a new authentication will be required before the first, the 4th, the 7th, etc. access). The card may enforce this value, e.g. through the use of "counter objects" (see ISO/IEC 7816-8). A value of 1 means that a new authentication is required before each access.

The **accessControlRules** component gives an alternative, and more fine-grained, way to inform a host-side application about security conditions for various methods of accessing the object in question. Any Boolean expression in available authentication methods is allowed. If a certain access mode is not allowed, there shall

be no access control rule for it (i.e. it is implicit). If this component is not present, access control rules will have to be deduced by other means. The **authReference** option allows for a closer coupling with other parts of ISO/IEC 7816, through the reference to Security Environments and identification of the class of authentication method (**authMethod**).

NOTE 1 When the **accessControlRules** component and the **authID** component both are present, information in the **accessControlRule** component takes precedence. This can occur for backwards-compatibility reasons.

NOTE 2 Since properties related to access control can be deduced e.g. by studying EFs FCI, such information is optional and not necessary when these circumstances applies (see also ISO/IEC 7816-4).

NOTE 3 The access control information represented in these structures reflects access control rules in the card, but is not necessarily used as such by the card.

8.2.9 CommonKeyAttributes

```
CommonKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    iD                Identifier,
    usage             KeyUsageFlags,
    native            BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE,
    accessFlags       KeyAccessFlags OPTIONAL,
    keyReference       KeyReference OPTIONAL,
    startDate         GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
    endDate           [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
    algReference       [1] SEQUENCE OF Reference OPTIONAL,
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

```
KeyUsageFlags ::= BIT STRING {
    encipher          (0),
    decipher          (1),
    sign              (2),
    signRecover       (3),
    keyEncipher        (4),
    keyDecipher        (5),
    verify             (6),
    verifyRecover      (7),
    derive             (8),
    nonRepudiation     (9)
}
```

```
KeyAccessFlags ::= BIT STRING {
    sensitive          (0),
    extractable        (1),
    alwaysSensitive    (2),
    neverExtractable    (3),
    cardGenerated      (4)
}
```

```
KeyReference ::= INTEGER
```

The **iD** component shall be unique for each key information object, except when a public key information object and its corresponding private key information object are stored on the same card. In this case, the information objects shall share the same identifier (which may also be shared with one or several certificate information objects, see 8.2.15).

The **usage** component (**encipher**, **decipher**, **sign**, **signRecover**, **keyEncipher**, **keyDecipher**, **verify**, **verifyRecover**, **derive** and **nonRepudiation**) signals the possible usage of the key. Actual algorithms and methods used for these operations are implicit and not defined in this part of ISO/IEC 7816. To map between ISO/IEC 9594-8:1998 **keyUsage** flags for public keys, CIO flags for public keys, and CIO flags for private keys, use the following table:

Table 2 — Mapping between CIO key usage flags and ISO/IEC 9594-8:1998 key usage flags

Key usage flags for public keys in ISO/IEC 9594-8 public key certificates	Corresponding CIO key usage flags for public keys	Corresponding CIO key usage flags for private keys
DataEncipherment	Encipher	Decipher
DigitalSignature, keyCertSign, cRLSign (signature algorithms without message recovery)	Verify	Sign
DigitalSignature, keyCertSign, cRLSign (signature algorithms with message recovery)	VerifyRecover	SignRecover
KeyAgreement	Derive	Derive
KeyEncipherment	KeyEncipher	KeyDecipher
NonRepudiation	NonRepudiation	NonRepudiation
NOTE 1 Implementations should verify that all key usage flags for a particular key pair is consistent.		
NOTE 2 Only those ISO/IEC 9594-8 key usage flags that are relevant for this part of ISO/IEC 7816 have been given a mapping.		

The **native** component identifies whether the cryptographic algorithms associated with the key are implemented in the card hardware.

The interpretation of the **KeyAccessFlags** bits shall be as follows:

- **sensitive** indicates that the key material cannot be revealed in plaintext outside the card;
- if **extractable** is not set the key material cannot be extracted from the card, even in encrypted form;
- **alwaysSensitive** indicates that the key has always been **sensitive**;
- **neverExtractable** indicates that the key has never been **extractable**; and
- **cardGenerated** indicates that the key was randomly generated on the card.

The **accessFlags** component may be absent in cases where its value can be deduced by other means.

The **keyReference** component is only applicable for cards with cryptographic capabilities. If present, it contains a card-specific reference to the key in question (for further information see ISO/IEC 7816-4 and ISO/IEC 7816-8).

NOTE The value of the **keyReference** component is intended for use in key reference DOs (ISO/IEC 7816-4), and any values, also negative values, are conceivable.

The **startDate** and **endDate** components, if present, indicate the period during which the key is valid for use.

The **algReference** component identifies algorithms the key may be used with by referencing **supportedAlgorithm** values from the EF.CIAInfo file.

8.2.10 CommonPrivateKeyAttributes

```
CommonPrivateKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    name          Name OPTIONAL,
    keyIdentifiers [0] SEQUENCE OF CredentialIdentifier {{KeyIdentifiers}} OPTIONAL,
    generalName    [1] GeneralNames OPTIONAL,
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

The **name** component, when present, names the owner of the key, as specified in a corresponding certificate's **subject** component.

Values of the **keyIdentifiers** component can be matched to identifiers from external messages or protocols to select the appropriate key to a given operation. The values can also be transmitted to a receiving party to indicate which key was used. A number of mechanisms for identifying a key are supported (see 8.2.4).

The **generalName** component, when present, provides other ways to identify the owner of the key.

8.2.11 CommonPublicKeyAttributes

```
CommonPublicKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    name          Name OPTIONAL,
    trustedUsage   [0] Usage OPTIONAL,
    generalName    [1] GeneralNames OPTIONAL,
    keyIdentifiers [2] SEQUENCE OF CredentialIdentifier {{KeyIdentifiers}} OPTIONAL,
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

The interpretation of the **name**, **generalName** and **keyIdentifiers** components of the **CommonPublicKeyAttributes** type shall be the same as for the corresponding components of the **CommonPrivateKeyAttributes**.

The **trustedUsage** component indicates one or more purposes for which the public key is trusted by the cardholder (see 8.2.15).

NOTE The exact semantics of "trust" is outside the scope of this part of ISO/IEC 7816.

8.2.12 CommonSecretKeyAttributes

```
CommonSecretKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    keyLen  INTEGER OPTIONAL, -- keylength (in bits)
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

The optional **keyLen** component signals the key length used, in those cases where a particular algorithm can have a varying key length.

8.2.13 GenericKeyAttributes

```
GenericKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    keyType CIO-ALGORITHM.&objectIdentifier {{AllowedAlgorithms}},
    keyAttr CIO-ALGORITHM.&Parameters {{AllowedAlgorithms}}{@keyType}
}
```

AllowedAlgorithms CIO-ALGORITHM ::= {...}

This type is intended to contain information *specific* to a key of a given kind. The definition of the **AllowedAlgorithms** information object set is deferred, perhaps to standardized profiles or to protocol implementation conformance statements. The set is required to specify a table constraint on the components of **GenericKeyAttributes**.

8.2.14 KeyInfo

```

KeyInfo {ParameterType, OperationsType} ::= CHOICE {
    paramsAndOps SEQUENCE {
        parameters ParameterType,
        operations OperationsType OPTIONAL
    },
    reference      Reference -- Historical, not to be used
}

```

NOTE PKCS #15 uses the **reference** option.

This type, which is an optional part of each private and public key type, contains either algorithm-specific details about the parameters of the key and operations supported by the card or a reference to such information. If present, algorithm-specific values override any values referenced by the **CommonKeyAttributes.algReference** component.

8.2.15 CommonCertificateAttributes

```

CommonCertificateAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    id          Identifier,
    authority    BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
    identifier    CredentialIdentifier {{KeyIdentifiers}} OPTIONAL,
    certHash     [0] CertHash OPTIONAL,
    trustedUsage [1] Usage OPTIONAL,
    identifiers   [2] SEQUENCE OF CredentialIdentifier {{KeyIdentifiers}} OPTIONAL,
    validity     [4] Validity OPTIONAL,
    ...
} -- Context tag [3] is reserved for historical reasons

```

NOTE PKCS #15 uses context tag [3].

```

Usage ::= SEQUENCE {
    keyUsage KeyUsage OPTIONAL,
    extKeyUsage SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
    ...
} (WITH COMPONENTS {..., keyUsage PRESENT} | WITH COMPONENTS {..., extKeyUsage PRESENT})

```

When a public key in a certificate referenced by a certificate information object corresponds to a private key referenced by a private key information object, then the information objects shall share the same value for the **id** component. This requirement will simplify searches for a private key corresponding to a particular certificate and vice versa. Multiple certificates for the same key shall share the same value for the **id** component.

The **authority** component indicates whether the certificate is for an authority (e.g. certification authority) or not.

The **identifier** component is present for historical reasons only, and the **identifiers** component shall be used instead.

The **certHash** component is useful from a security perspective when a certificate is stored external to the card (the **url** choice of **ReferencedValue**), since it enables a user to verify that no one has tampered with the certificate.

The **trustedUsage** component indicates one or more purposes for which the certified public key is trusted by the cardholder. Object identifiers for the **extKeyUsage** component may be defined by any organization with a need. For actual usage, the intersection of the indicated usage in this component, and the **keyUsage** extension (if present) in the certificate itself should be taken. If the **trustedUsage** component is absent, all usage is possible.

NOTE 1 The exact semantics of “trust” is outside the scope of this part of ISO/IEC 7816.

NOTE 2 To find a *cardholder* certificate for a specific usage, use the **commonKeyAttributes.usage** component, and follow the cross-reference (**commonKeyAttributes.id**) to an appropriate certificate.

The **identifiers** component simplifies the search of a particular certificate, when the requester knows (and conveys) some distinguishing information about the requested certificate. This can be used, for example, when a user certificate has to be chosen and sent to a server as part of a user authentication, and the server provides the client with distinguishing information for a particular certificate. Use of the **subjectNameHash** and **issuerNameHash** alternatives may also facilitate fast chain building.

The **validity** component provides information about the certificate's validity period.

8.2.16 GenericCertificateAttributes

```
GenericCertificateAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    certType CIO-OPAQUE.&id ({AllowedCertificates}),
    certAttr CIO-OPAQUE.&Type ({AllowedCertificates}{@certType})
}
```

AllowedCertificates CIO-OPAQUE ::= {...}

This type is intended to contain information *specific* to a certificate of any kind. The definition of the **AllowedCertificates** information object set is deferred, perhaps to standardized profiles or to protocol implementation conformance statements. The set is required to specify a table constraint on the components of **GenericCertificateAttributes**.

8.2.17 CommonDataContainerObjectAttributes

```
CommonDataContainerObjectAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    applicationName Label OPTIONAL,
    applicationOID OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
    iD Identifier OPTIONAL,
    ... -- For future extensions
} (WITH COMPONENTS {..., applicationName PRESENT}
| WITH COMPONENTS {..., applicationOID PRESENT})
```

The **applicationName** component is intended to contain the name or the registered object identifier for the application to which the data container object in question “belongs”. In order to avoid application name collisions, at least the **applicationOID** alternative is recommended. As indicated in ASN.1, at least one of the components has to be present in a value of type **CommonDataContainerObjectAttributes**.

The **iD** component may be used to associate a certain data container object with some other CIO, e.g. a private key information object.

8.2.18 CommonAuthenticationObjectAttributes

```
CommonAuthenticationObjectAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    authId Identifier OPTIONAL,
    authReference Reference OPTIONAL,
    selIdentifier [0] Reference OPTIONAL,
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

The **authId** shall be a unique identifier. It is used for cross-reference purposes from private CIOs.

The **authReference** component, when present, shall contain a value of a “key reference” object (see ISO/IEC 7816-4), which is the way to reference these keys in Security Environments.

The **selIdentifier** component, when present, identifies the security environment to which the authentication object belongs.

8.2.19 The CIO type

This type is a template for all kinds of CIOs. It is parameterized with object class attributes, object subclass attributes and object type attributes.

```
CIO {ClassAttributes, SubClassAttributes, TypeAttributes} ::= SEQUENCE {
    commonObjectAttributes  CommonObjectAttributes,
    classAttributes          ClassAttributes,
    subClassAttributes       [0] SubClassAttributes OPTIONAL,
    typeAttributes           [1] TypeAttributes
}
```

8.3 The CIOChoice type

```
CIOChoice ::= CHOICE {
    privateKeys          [0] PrivateKeys,
    publicKeys           [1] PublicKeys,
    trustedPublicKeys    [2] PublicKeys,
    secretKeys           [3] SecretKeys,
    certificates         [4] Certificates,
    trustedCertificates   [5] Certificates,
    usefulCertificates    [6] Certificates,
    dataContainerObjects [7] DataContainerObjects,
    authObjects          [8] AuthObjects,
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

PrivateKeys ::= PathOrObjects {PrivateKeyChoice}

PublicKeys ::= PathOrObjects {PublicKeyChoice}

SecretKeys ::= PathOrObjects {SecretKeyChoice}

Certificates ::= PathOrObjects {CertificateChoice}

DataContainerObjects ::= PathOrObjects {DataContainerObjectChoice}

AuthObjects ::= PathOrObjects {AuthenticationObjectChoice}

EF.OD shall contain the concatenation of 0, 1 or more DER-encoded **CIOChoice** values. Any number of 'FF' octets may occur before, between, or after the values without any meaning (i.e. as padding for unused space or delete values). A specific choice may appear more than once in the file (which may be done, for example, to apply different access control rules to separate collections of objects of the same type).

It is expected that an EF.OD entry will usually reference a separate file (the **path** choice of **PathOrObjects**) containing CIOs of the indicated type. An entry may, however, hold CIOs directly (the **objects** choice of **PathOrObjects**), if the objects and the EF.OD file have the same access control requirements.

The **trustedPublicKeys** component references public key information objects describing public keys that are trusted by the cardholder for some purpose, such as being the trust point (root) for certificate path processing.

The **certificates** choice references certificate information objects describing certificates issued to the card or the cardholder.

The **trustedCertificates** component references certificate information objects describing certificates trusted by the cardholder for their indicated purposes. For instance, CA certificates referenced by this component may be used as trust points (roots) during certificate path processing.

NOTE To maintain the desired trust in given certificates and/or public keys, their associated CIOs within **trustedCertificates** and/or **trustedPublicKeys** components need appropriate protection against modification (i.e. appropriate access control). This protection must apply to the EF.OD file, any CIO file referenced by the **trustedCertificates** or **trustedPublicKeys** components, and any actual key or certificate file referenced from the individual CIOs.

A **usefulCertificates** component references certificate information objects describing certificates that does not belong in either a **trustedCertificates** or **certificates** component. It may be used to store either end-entity or CA

certificates that may be useful, e.g. a certificate for a colleague's encryption key or intermediate CA certificates to simplify certificate path processing.

8.4 Private key information objects

8.4.1 PrivateKeyChoice

```
PrivateKeyChoice ::= CHOICE {
    privateRSAKey      PrivateKeyObject {PrivateKeyAttributes},
    privateECKey       [0] PrivateKeyObject {PrivateKeyAttributes},
    privateDHKey       [1] PrivateKeyObject {PrivateKeyAttributes},
    privateDSAPrivateKey [2] PrivateKeyObject {PrivateKeyAttributes},
    privateKEAPrivateKey [3] PrivateKeyObject {PrivateKeyAttributes},
    genericPrivateKey   [4] PrivateKeyObject {GenericKeyAttributes},
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

```
PrivateKeyObject {KeyAttributes} ::= CIO {
    CommonKeyAttributes, CommonPrivateKeyAttributes, KeyAttributes}
```

This type contains information pertaining to a private key. Each value consists of attributes common to any object, any key, any private key and attributes particular to the key.

8.4.2 Private RSA key attributes

```
PrivateRSAKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    value          Path,
    modulusLength  INTEGER, -- modulus length in bits, e.g. 1024
    keyInfo        KeyInfo {NULL, PublicKeyOperations} OPTIONAL,
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

The interpretation of the components shall be as follows:

- **PrivateRSAKeyAttributes.value:** The value shall be a path to a file containing a private RSA key. If there is no need to specify a path to a file, the path value may be set to the empty path.
- **PrivateRSAKeyAttributes.modulusLength:** On many cards, one needs to format data to be signed prior to sending the data to the card. In order to be able to format the data in a correct manner the length of the key must be known. The length shall be expressed in bits, e.g. 1024.
- **PrivateRSAKeyAttributes.keyInfo:** Information about parameters that applies to this key and operations the card can carry out with it. The values override any **CIAInfo.supportedAlgorithms** value referenced by the **CommonKeyAttributes.algReference** component. The component is not needed if the information is available through other means.

8.4.3 Private Elliptic Curve key attributes

```
PrivateECKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    value      Path,
    keyInfo    KeyInfo {Parameters, PublicKeyOperations} OPTIONAL,
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

The interpretation of the components shall be as follows:

- **PrivateECKeyAttributes.value:** The value shall be a path to a file containing a private elliptic-curve key. If there is no need to specify a path to a file, the path value may be set to the empty path.
- **PrivateECKeyAttributes.keyInfo:** See corresponding component in 8.4.2.

8.4.4 Private Diffie-Hellman key attributes

```
PrivateDHKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    value      Path,
    keyInfo    KeyInfo {DomainParameters, PublicKeyOperations} OPTIONAL,
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

The interpretation of the components shall be as follows:

- **PrivateDHKeyAttributes.value**: The value shall be a path to a file a private Diffie-Hellman key. If there is no need to specify a path to a file, the path value may be set to the empty path.
- **PrivateDHKeyAttributes.keyInfo**: See corresponding component in 8.4.2.

8.4.5 Private DSA key attributes

```
PrivateDSAKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    value      Path,
    keyInfo    KeyInfo {DomainParameters, PublicKeyOperations} OPTIONAL,
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

The interpretation of the components shall be as follows:

- **PrivateDSAKeyAttributes.value**: The value shall be a path to a file containing a private DSA key. If there is no need to specify a path to a file, the path value may be set to the empty path.
- **PrivateDSAKeyAttributes.keyInfo**: See corresponding component in 8.4.2.

8.4.6 Private KEA key attributes

```
PrivateKEAKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    value      Path,
    keyInfo    KeyInfo {DomainParameters, PublicKeyOperations} OPTIONAL,
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

The interpretation of the components shall be as follows:

- **PrivateKEAKeyAttributes.value**: The value shall be a path to a file containing a private KEA key. If there is no need to specify a path to a file, the path value may be set to the empty path.
- **PrivateKEAKeyAttributes.keyInfo**: See corresponding component in 8.4.2.

8.4.7 Generic Private key information objects

This type is intended to contain information specific to a private key of any kind. See 8.2.13.

8.5 Public key information objects

8.5.1 PublicKeyChoice

```
PublicKeyChoice ::= CHOICE {
    publicRSAKey      PublicKeyObject {PublicKeyRSAKeyAttributes},
    publicECKKey      [0] PublicKeyObject {PublicECKKeyAttributes},
    publicDHKey       [1] PublicKeyObject {PublicDHKeyAttributes},
    publicDSAKey      [2] PublicKeyObject {PublicDSAKeyAttributes},
```

```

publicKEAKey      [3] PublicKeyObject {PublicKEAKeyAttributes},
genericPublicKey  [4] PublicKeyObject {GenericKeyAttributes},
... -- For future extensions
}

```

```

PublicKeyObject {KeyAttributes} ::= CIO {
    CommonKeyAttributes, CommonPublicKeyAttributes, KeyAttributes}

```

This type contains information pertaining to a public key. Each value consists of attributes common to any object, any key, any public key and attributes particular to the key.

8.5.2 Public RSA key attributes

```

PublicRSAKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    value          ObjectValue {RSAPublicKeyChoice},
    modulusLength  INTEGER, -- modulus length in bits, e.g. 1024
    keyInfo        KeyInfo {NULL, PublicKeyOperations} OPTIONAL,
    ... -- For future extensions
}

RSAPublicKeyChoice ::= CHOICE {
    raw          RSAPublicKey,
    spki         [1] SubjectPublicKeyInfo, -- See ISO/IEC 9594-8:1998. Must contain a public RSA key.
    ...
}

RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
    modulus        INTEGER,
    publicExponent INTEGER
}

```

The interpretation of the components shall be as follows:

- **PublicRSAKeyAttributes.value:** The value shall be a path to a file containing either an **RSAPublicKeyChoice** value or (some card-specific representation of) a public RSA key.
- **PublicRSAKeyAttributes.modulusLength:** On many cards, one must format data to be encrypted prior to sending the data to the card. In order to be able to format the data in a correct manner the length of the key must be known. The length shall be expressed in bits, e.g. 1024.
- **PublicRSAKeyAttributes.keyInfo:** See corresponding component in 8.4.2.

8.5.3 Public Elliptic Curve key attributes

```

PublicECKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    value          ObjectValue {ECPublicKeyChoice},
    keyInfo        KeyInfo {Parameters, PublicKeyOperations} OPTIONAL,
    ... -- For future extensions
}

ECPublicKeyChoice ::= CHOICE {
    raw          ECPoint, -- See ANSI X9.62,
    spki         SubjectPublicKeyInfo, -- See ISO/IEC 9594-8:1998. Must contain a public elliptic-curve key
    ...
}

```

The interpretation of the components shall be as follows:

- **PublicECKeyAttributes.value:** The value shall be a path to a file containing either an **ECPublicKeyChoice** value or (some card-specific representation of) a public elliptic curve key.
- **PublicECKeyAttributes.keyInfo:** See corresponding component in 8.4.2.

8.5.4 Public Diffie-Hellman key attributes

```
PublicDHKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    value      ObjectValue {DHPublicKeyChoice},
    keyInfo    KeyInfo {DomainParameters, PublicKeyOperations} OPTIONAL,
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

```
DHPublicKeyChoice ::= CHOICE {
    raw        DHPublicNumber,
    spki       SubjectPublicKeyInfo, -- See ISO/IEC 9594-8:1998. Must contain a public D-H key.
    ...
}
```

DHPublicNumber ::= INTEGER

The interpretation of the components shall be as follows:

- **PublicDHKeyAttributes.value**: The value shall be a path to a file containing either a **DHPublicKeyChoice** value or (some card-specific representation of) a public D-H key.
- **PublicDHKeyAttributes.keyInfo**: See corresponding component in 8.4.2.

8.5.5 Public DSA key attributes

```
PublicDSAKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    value      ObjectValue {DSAPublicKeyChoice},
    keyInfo    KeyInfo {DomainParameters, PublicKeyOperations} OPTIONAL,
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

```
DSAPublicKeyChoice ::= CHOICE {
    raw        DSAPublicKey,
    spki       SubjectPublicKeyInfo, -- See ISO/IEC 9594-8:1998. Must contain a public DSA key.
    ...
}
```

DSAPublicKey ::= INTEGER

The interpretation of the components shall be as follows:

- **PublicDSAKeyAttributes.value**: The value shall be a path to a file containing either a **DSAPublicKeyChoice** value or (some card-specific representation of) a public DSA key.
- **PublicDSAKeyAttributes.keyInfo**: See corresponding component in 8.4.2.

8.5.6 Public KEA key attributes

```
PublicKEAKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    value      ObjectValue {KEAPublicKeyChoice},
    keyInfo    KeyInfo {DomainParameters, PublicKeyOperations} OPTIONAL,
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

```
KEAPublicKeyChoice ::= CHOICE {
    raw        KEAPublicKey,
    spki       SubjectPublicKeyInfo, -- See ISO/IEC 9594-8:1998. Must contain a public KEA key.
    ...
}
```

KEAPublicKey ::= INTEGER

The interpretation of the components shall be as follows:

- **PublicKEAKeyAttributes.value**: The value shall be a path to a file containing either a **KEAPublicKeyChoice** value or (some card-specific representation of) a public KEA key.
- **PublicKEAKeyAttributes.keyInfo**: See corresponding component in 8.4.2.

8.5.7 Generic public key information objects

This type is intended to contain information specific to a public key of any kind. See 8.2.13.

8.6 Secret key information objects

8.6.1 SecretKeyChoice

```
SecretKeyChoice ::= CHOICE {
    algIndependentKey SecretKeyObject {SecretKeyAttributes},
    genericSecretKey   [15] SecretKeyObject {GenericKeyAttributes},
    ... -- For future extensions
} -- Note: Context tags [0] – [14] are historical and not to be used
```

NOTE PKCS #15 uses these tags.

```
SecretKeyObject {KeyAttributes} ::= CIO {
    CommonKeyAttributes, CommonSecretKeyAttributes, KeyAttributes}
```

This type contains information pertaining to a secret key. Each value consists of attributes common to any object, any key, any secret key and attributes particular to the key.

8.6.2 Algorithm independent key attributes

These objects represent secret keys available for use in various algorithms, or for derivation of other secret keys.

```
SecretKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    value ObjectValue { OCTET STRING },
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

The interpretation of the component shall be as follows:

- **SecretKeyAttributes.value**: The value shall be a path to a file either containing an **OCTET STRING** or (in the case of a card capable of performing secret-key operations) some card specific representation of the key.

8.6.3 The GenericSecretKey type

This type is intended to contain information specific to a secret key of any kind. See 8.2.13.

8.7 Certificate information objects

8.7.1 CertificateChoice

```
CertificateChoice ::= CHOICE {
    x509Certificate           CertificateObject {X509CertificateAttributes},
    x509AttributeCertificate [0] CertificateObject {X509AttributeCertificateAttributes},
    spkiCertificate          [1] CertificateObject {SPKICertificateAttributes},
    pgpCertificate           [2] CertificateObject {PGPCertificateAttributes},
    wtlsCertificate          [3] CertificateObject {WTLSCertificateAttributes},
    x9-68Certificate         [4] CertificateObject {X9-68CertificateAttributes},
```

```

cvCertificate          [5] CertificateObject {CVCertificateAttributes},
genericCertificateObject [6] CertificateObject {GenericCertificateAttributes},
... -- For future extensions
}

```

```

CertificateObject {CertAttributes} ::= CIO {
  CommonCertificateAttributes, NULL, CertAttributes}

```

This type contains information pertaining to a certificate. Each value consists of attributes common to any object, any certificate and attributes particular to the certificate.

8.7.2 X.509 certificate attributes

```

X509CertificateAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
  value      ObjectValue { Certificate },
  subject    Name OPTIONAL,
  issuer     [0] Name OPTIONAL,
  serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber OPTIONAL,
  ... -- For future extensions
}

```

The interpretation of the components shall be as follows:

- **X509CertificateAttributes.value**: The value shall be a **ReferencedValue** either identifying a file containing a DER encoded certificate at the given location, or a URL pointing to some location where the certificate can be found.
- **X509CertificateAttributes.subject**, **X509CertificateAttributes.issuer** and **X509CertificateAttributes.serialNumber**: The semantics of these components is the same as for the corresponding components in ISO/IEC 9594-8:1998. The values of these components shall be exactly the same as for the corresponding components in the certificate itself. The reason for making them optional is to provide some space-efficiency, since they already are present in the certificate itself.

8.7.3 X.509 attribute certificate attributes

```

X509AttributeCertificateAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
  value      ObjectValue { AttributeCertificate },
  issuer     GeneralNames OPTIONAL,
  serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber OPTIONAL,
  attrTypes  [0] SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
  ... -- For future extensions
}

```

The interpretation of the components shall be as follows:

- **X509AttributeCertificateAttributes.value**: The value shall be a **ReferencedValue** identifying either a file containing a DER encoded attribute certificate at the given location, or a URL pointing to some location where the attribute certificate can be found.
- **X509AttributeCertificateAttributes.issuer** and **X509AttributeCertificateAttributes.serialNumber**: The values of these components shall be exactly the same as for the corresponding components in the attribute certificate itself. They may be stored explicitly for easier lookup.
- **X509AttributeCertificateAttributes.attrTypes**: This optional component shall, when present, contain a list of object identifiers for the attributes that are present in this attribute certificate. This offers an opportunity for applications to search for a particular attribute certificate without reading and parsing the certificate itself.

8.7.4 SPKI certificate attributes

NOTE SPKI Certificates are defined in IETF RFC 2693 (see the bibliography).

```

SPKICertificateAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    value      ObjectValue { CIO-OPAQUE.&Type },
    ... -- For future extensions
}

```

The interpretation of the component shall be as follows:

- **SPKICertificateAttributes.value**: The value shall be a **ReferencedValue** identifying either a file containing a SPKI certificate at the given location, or a URL pointing to some location where the certificate can be found.

8.7.5 PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) certificate attributes

NOTE PGP Certificates are defined in IETF RFC 2440 (see the bibliography).

```

PGPCertificateAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    value      ObjectValue { CIO-OPAQUE.&Type },
    ... -- For future extensions
}

```

The interpretation of the component shall be as follows:

- **PGPCertificateAttributes.value**: The value shall be a **ReferencedValue** identifying either a file containing a PGP certificate at the given location, or a URL pointing to some location where the certificate can be found.

8.7.6 WTLS certificate attributes

NOTE WTLS Certificates are defined in the "Wireless Transport Layer Security Protocol" specification (see the bibliography).

```

WTLSCertificateAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    value      ObjectValue { CIO-OPAQUE.&Type },
    ... -- For future extensions
}

```

The interpretation of the component shall be as follows:

- **WTLSCertificateAttributes.value**: The value shall be a **ReferencedValue** identifying either a file containing a WTLS encoded certificate at the given location, or a URL pointing to some location where the certificate can be found.

8.7.7 ANSI X9.68 domain certificate attributes

NOTE X9.68 domain certificates are defined in ANSI X9.68:2-2001 (see the bibliography).

```

X9-68CertificateAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    value      ObjectValue { CIO-OPAQUE.&Type },
    ... -- For future extensions
}

```

The interpretation of the component shall be as follows:

- **X9-68CertificateAttributes.value**: The value shall be a **ReferencedValue** identifying either a file containing a DER or PER (ISO/IEC 8825-2:1998) encoded ANSI X9.68:2-2001 domain certificate at the given location, or a URL pointing to some location where the certificate can be found.

8.7.8 Card Verifiable Certificate attributes

NOTE Card Verifiable Certificates are defined in ISO/IEC 7816-8. Their main use is in public-key based card authentication methods.

```

CVCertificateAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    value      ObjectValue { CIO-OPAQUE.&Type },
    ... -- For future extensions
}

```

The interpretation of the component shall be as follows:

- **CVCertificateAttributes.value**: The value shall be a **ReferencedValue** identifying either a file containing an ISO/IEC 7816-8 Card Verifiable Certificate at the given location, or a URL pointing to some location where the certificate can be found.

8.7.9 Generic certificate attributes

This type is intended to contain information specific to a certificate of any kind. See 8.2.16.

8.8 Data container information objects

8.8.1 DataContainerObjectChoice

```
DataContainerObjectChoice ::= CHOICE {
    opaqueDO      DataContainerObject {OpaqueDOAttributes},
    iso7816DO     [0] DataContainerObject {ISO7816DOAttributes},
    oidDO         [1] DataContainerObject {OidDOAttributes},
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

```
DataContainerObject {DataObjectAttributes} ::= CIO {
    CommonDataContainerObjectAttributes, NULL, DataObjectAttributes}
```

This type contains information pertaining to a data container object. Each value consists of attributes common to any object, any data container object and attributes particular to the data container object.

8.8.2 Opaque data container object attributes

Interpretation of these objects is left to applications accessing them.

```
OpaqueDOAttributes ::= ObjectValue {CIO-OPAQUE.&Type}
```

8.8.3 ISO/IEC 7816 data object attributes

EF.DCOD may contain information about one or several IDOs. These objects shall follow a compatible tag allocation scheme as defined in ISO/IEC 7816-4.

```
ISO7816DOAttributes ::= ObjectValue {CIO-OPAQUE.&Type}
(CONSTRAINED BY {-- All such data container objects shall be defined in accordance with ISO/IEC 7816-4 --})
```

Each **iso7816DO** entry in an EF.DCOD will therefore reference a file, which shall conform to ISO/IEC 7816-4. By using these data container objects, applications enhance interoperability.

When the CDE being referenced is a data object to be retrieved e.g. in a 'GET DATA' command, the **direct** choice of **ObjectValue** shall be used, and the **CIO-OPAQUE.&Type** value shall be the data object's tag.

8.8.4 Data container information objects identified by OBJECT IDENTIFIERS

This type provides a way to store, search, and retrieve data container objects with assigned object identifiers. An example of this type of information is any ASN.1 **ATTRIBUTE** (see ISO/IEC 9594-6:1998).

```
OidDOAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    id      CIO-OPAQUE.&id ({AllowedOidDOs}),
    value    CIO-OPAQUE.&Type ({AllowedOidDOs}{@id})
}
```

```
AllowedOidDOs CIO-OPAQUE ::= {...}
```

8.9 Authentication information objects

8.9.1 AuthenticationObjectChoice

```
AuthenticationObjectChoice ::= CHOICE {
    pwd                AuthenticationObject { PasswordAttributes },
    biometricTemplate  [0] AuthenticationObject { BiometricAttributes},
    authKey            [1] AuthenticationObject {AuthKeyAttributes},
    external           [2] AuthenticationObject {ExternalAuthObjectAttributes},
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

```
AuthenticationObject {AuthObjectAttributes} ::= CIO {
    CommonAuthenticationObjectAttributes, NULL, AuthObjectAttributes}
```

This type contains information about a particular authentication method. Each authentication object shall have a distinct `CommonAuthenticationObjectAttributes.authID`, enabling unambiguous authentication object lookup for private objects.

8.9.2 Password attributes

```
PasswordAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    pwdFlags        PasswordFlags,
    pwdType         PasswordType,
    minLength       INTEGER (cia-lb-minPasswordLength..cia-ub-minPasswordLength),
    storedLength    INTEGER (0..cia-ub-storedPasswordLength),
    maxLength       INTEGER OPTIONAL,
    pwdReference    [0] Reference DEFAULT 0,
    padChar         OCTET STRING (SIZE(1)) OPTIONAL,
    lastPasswordChangeGeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
    path            Path OPTIONAL,
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

```
PasswordFlags ::= BIT STRING {
    case-sensitive      (0),
    local              (1),
    change-disabled     (2),
    unblock-disabled    (3),
    initialized         (4),
    needs-padding       (5),
    unblockingPassword  (6),
    soPassword          (7),
    disable-allowed     (8),
    integrity-protected (9),
    confidentiality-protected (10),
    exchangeRefData     (11)
} (CONSTRAINED BY { -- 'unblockingPassword' and 'soPassword' cannot both be set -- })
```

```
PasswordType ::= ENUMERATED {bcd, ascii-numeric, utf8, half-nibble-bcd, iso9564-1, ...}
```

The interpretation of these types shall be as follows:

- **PasswordAttributes.pwdFlags**: This component signals whether the password:
 - is **case-sensitive**, meaning that a user-given password shall *not* be converted to all-uppercase before presented to the card (see below);
 - is **local**, meaning that the password is local to the application to which it belongs;

NOTE A pwd, which is not “local”, is considered “global”. A local password may only be used to protect data within a given application. For a local password the lifetime of verification is not guaranteed and it may have to be re-verified on each use. In contrast to this, a successful verification of a global password means that the verification remains in effect until the card has been removed or reset, or until a new verification of the same password fails. An application, which has verified a global password, can assume that the password remains valid, even if other applications verify their own, local passwords, select other DFs, etc.

- is **change-disabled**, meaning that it is not possible to change the password;
- is **unblock-disabled**, meaning that it is not possible to unblock the password;
- is **initialized**, meaning that the password has been initialized;
- **needs-padding**, meaning that, depending on the length of the given password and the stored length, the password may need to be padded before being presented to the card;
- is an **unblockingPassword** (ISO/IEC 7816-4 *resetting code*), meaning that this password may be used for unblocking purposes, i.e. to reset the retry counter of the related authentication object to its initial value;
- is a **soPassword**, meaning that the password is a Security Officer (administrator) password;

NOTE Since passwords are described by CIOs other authentication objects may protect them. This gives a way to specify the password that can be used to unblock (i.e. reset retry counter for) another password — let the **authID** of a password information object point to an unblocking password authentication object.

- is **disable-allowed**, meaning that the password might be disabled;
- shall be presented to the card with secure messaging (**integrity-protected**);
- shall be presented to the card encrypted (**confidentiality-protected**);
- can be changed by just presenting new reference data to the card or if both old and new reference data needs to be presented. If the bit is set, both old and new reference data shall be presented; otherwise only new reference data needs to be presented (**exchangeRefData**).
- **PasswordAttributes.pwdType**: This component determines the type of password:
 - **bcd** (Binary Coded Decimal, each nibble of a byte shall contain one digit of the password);
 - **ascii-numeric** (Each byte of the password contain an ASCII (ANSI X3.4, see the bibliography) encoded digit);
 - **utf8** (Each character is encoded in accordance with UTF-8);
 - **half-nibble-bcd** (lower nibble of a byte shall contain one digit of the password, upper nibble shall contain 'F'); or
 - **iso9564-1** (Encoding in accordance with ISO 9564-1:1996).
- **PasswordAttributes.minLength**: Minimum length (in characters) of new passwords (if allowed to change).
- **PasswordAttributes.storedLength**: Stored length on card (in bytes). Used to deduce the number of padding characters needed. Value can be set to 0 and disregarded if **pwdFlags** indicate that padding is not needed (i.e. no padding characters are sent to the card).
- **PasswordAttributes.maxLength**: On some cards, passwords are not padded, and there is therefore a need to know the maximum password length (in characters) allowed.

- **PasswordAttributes.pwdReference**: This component is a card-specific reference to the password. It is anticipated that it can be used as a 'P2' parameter in the ISO/IEC 7816-4 'VERIFY' command, when applicable. If not present, it defaults to the value 0.
- **PasswordAttributes.padChar**: Padding character to use (usually 'FF' or '00'). Not needed if **pwdFlags** indicates that padding is not needed for this card. If the **PasswordAttributes.pwdType** is of type **bcd**, then **padChar** should consist of two nibbles of the same value, any nibble could be used as the "padding nibble". E.g., '55' is allowed, meaning padding with '0101₂', but '34' is illegal.
- **PasswordAttributes.lastPasswordChange**: This component is intended to be used in applications that requires knowledge of the date the password last was changed (e.g. to enforce password expiration policies). When the password is not set (or never has been changed) the value shall be (using the value-notation defined in ISO/IEC 8824-1:1998) '000000000000Z'. As another example, a password changed on January 6, 1999 at 1934 (7 34 PM) UTC would have a **lastPasswordChange** value of '19990106193400Z'.
- **PasswordAttributes.path**: Path to the DF in which the password resides. The path shall be selected by a host application before doing a password operation, in order to enable a suitable authentication context for the password operation. If not present, a card-holder verification shall always be possible to perform without a prior 'SELECT' operation.

8.9.2.1 Encoding a supplied password

The steps taken by a host-side application to encode a user-supplied password to something presented to the card shall be as follows:

- a) Convert the password in accordance with the password type:
 - 1) If the password is a **utf8** password, transform it to UTF-8: $x = UTF8(password)$. Then, if the **case-sensitive** bit is off, convert x to uppercase: $x = NLSUPPERCASE(x)$ ($NLSUPPERCASE$ = locale dependent uppercase)
 - 2) If the password is a **bcd** password, verify that each character is a digit and encode the characters as BCD digits: $x = BCD(password)$
 - 3) If the password is an **ascii-numeric** or **iso9564-1** password, verify that each character is a digit in the current code-page and – if needed – encode the characters as ASCII digits: $x = ASCII(password)$
 - 4) If the password is a **half-nibble-bcd** password, verify that each character is a digit and encode the characters as BCD in the lower half of each byte, setting each upper nibble to 'F₁₆': $x = HalfBCD(password)$
- b) If indicated in the **pwdFlags** component, pad x to the right with the padding character, **padChar**, to stored length **storedLength**: $x = PAD(x, padChar, storedLength)$.
- c) If the **pwdFlags.integrity-protected** or **pwdFlags.confidentiality-protected** bits are set, apply the appropriate algorithms and keys to the converted and formatted password.
- d) Present the password to the card.

EXAMPLE (ascii-) Numeric password **1234**, stored length 8 bytes, and padding character 'FF' gives that the value presented to the card will be '31323334FFFFFFFF'

8.9.3 Biometric reference data attributes

This type, only relevant to cards capable of performing authentications by comparing stored biometric reference data with presented biometric verification data, contains information about the stored biometric reference data ("template").

BiometricAttributes ::= CHOICE {
 biometricTemplateAttributes **BiometricTemplateAttributes**,
 bit [APPLICATION 96] **BiometricInformationTemplate**,
 bitGroup [APPLICATION 97] **BiometricInformationTemplateGroup**
 }

BiometricInformationTemplate ::= OCTET STRING -- Shall contain an ISO/IEC 7816-11 BIT value

BiometricInformationTemplateGroup ::= OCTET STRING
 -- Shall contain an ISO/IEC 7816-11 BIT group template value

BiometricTemplateAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
 bioFlags **BiometricFlags**,
 templateId **BiometricTemplateIdentifier**,
 bioType **BiometricType**,
 bioReference Reference DEFAULT 0,
 lastChange GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
 path Path OPTIONAL,
 ... -- For future extensions
 }

BiometricTemplateIdentifier ::= CHOICE {
 oid OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
 issuerId OCTET STRING,
 ... -- For future extensions
 }

BiometricFlags ::= BIT STRING {
 local (1),
 change-disabled (2),
 unblock-disabled (3),
 initialized (4),
 disable-allowed (8),
 integrity-protected (9),
 confidentiality-protected (10)
 }

BiometricType ::= CHOICE {
 fingerPrint **FingerPrintInformation**,
 iris [0] **IrisInformation**,
 chained [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (2..cia-ub-biometricTypes) OF **BiometricType**,
 ... -- For future extensions
 }

FingerPrintInformation ::= SEQUENCE {
 hand ENUMERATED {left, right},
 finger ENUMERATED {thumb, pointerFinger, middleFinger, ringFinger, littleFinger},
 }

IrisInformation ::= SEQUENCE {
 eye ENUMERATED {left, right},
 ... -- For future extensions
 }

The **BiometricAttributes** type provides for two distinct ways to present information about stored biometric reference data:

- through information specific to this part of ISO/IEC 7816 (the **biometricTemplateAttributes** component); or
- through information defined in ISO/IEC 7816-11 (the **bit** and **bitGroup** components).

The semantics of the components of the **BiometricTemplateAttributes** type is as follows:

- **BiometricAttributes.bioFlags**: Same as for **PasswordAttributes.pwdFlags**, but replace “password” with “biometrical reference data”.
- **BiometricAttributes.templateId**: This component identifies the data structure that has to be sent to the card.

- **BiometricAttributes.bioType**: This component determines the type of biometrical information stored in the card, e.g. the right pointer finger. The "chained" component means that more than one biometric feature has to be presented within the same verification process, possibly by using chained commands, in order for authentication to succeed.
- **BiometricAttributes.bioReference**, **BiometricAttributes.lastChange**, and **BiometricAttributes.path**: As for corresponding components in **PasswordAttributes**, but replace "password" with "biometrical reference data".

8.9.4 Authentication objects for external authentication

NOTE As this clause only describes ways to authenticate to the card, internal or mutual authentication is not discussed.

```
ExternalAuthObjectAttributes ::= CHOICE {
    authKeyAttributes    AuthKeyAttributes,
    certBasedAttributes [0] CertBasedAuthenticationAttributes,
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

```
AuthKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    derivedKey    BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE,
    authKeyId     Identifier,
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

```
CertBasedAuthenticationAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    cha    OCTET STRING,
    ...
}
```

The interpretation of these types shall be as follows:

- **AuthKeyAttributes.derivedKey**: This component specifies whether the authentication key stored in the card is a derived key (i.e. an individual key), a group key, or a master key, used for deriving individual keys.
- **AuthKeyAttributes.authKeyId**: This component specifies the identifier (**CommonKeyAttribute.iD**) of the authentication key as described in an EF.SKD.
- **CertBasedAuthenticationAttributes.cha**: This component specifies the certificate holder authorization as presented in a card-verifiable certificate (see ISO/IEC 7816-8). If a card-verifiable certificate containing this value is verified, and the authentication procedure with the corresponding key pair has been successfully completed, then the **cha** is set as valid, and access to private objects protected within this certificate-holder's authorization granted.

8.10 The cryptographic information file, EF.CIAInfo

This type contains general information about DF.CIA and the card.

```
CIAInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
    version                INTEGER {v1(0),v2(1)} (v1|v2,...),
    serialNumber           OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
    manufacturerID        Label OPTIONAL,
    label                  [0] Label OPTIONAL,
    cardflags              CardFlags,
    selInfo                SEQUENCE OF SecurityEnvironmentInfo OPTIONAL,
    recordInfo             [1] RecordInfo OPTIONAL,
    supportedAlgorithms    [2] SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmInfo OPTIONAL,
    issuerID               [3] Label OPTIONAL,
    holderID               [4] Label OPTIONAL,
    lastUpdate             [5] LastUpdate OPTIONAL,
    preferredLanguage      PrintableString OPTIONAL, -- In accordance with IETF RFC 1766
    profileIndication      [6] SEQUENCE OF ProfileIndication OPTIONAL,
    ...
} (CONSTRAINED BY { -- Each AlgorithmInfo.reference value shall be unique --})
```

```
CardFlags ::= BIT STRING {
    readonly      (0),
    authRequired  (1),
    prnGeneration (2)
} -- Bit (3) is reserved for historical reasons
```

```
SecurityEnvironmentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
    se      INTEGER,
    owner   OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
    aid     OCTET STRING
           (CONSTRAINED BY {-- Must be encoded in accordance with ISO/IEC 7816-4 --}) OPTIONAL,
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

```
RecordInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
    oDRecordLength [0] INTEGER (0..cia-ub-recordLength) OPTIONAL,
    prKRecordLength [1] INTEGER (0..cia-ub-recordLength) OPTIONAL,
    puKRecordLength [2] INTEGER (0..cia-ub-recordLength) OPTIONAL,
    sKRecordLength  [3] INTEGER (0..cia-ub-recordLength) OPTIONAL,
    cDRecordLength  [4] INTEGER (0..cia-ub-recordLength) OPTIONAL,
    dCODRecordLength [5] INTEGER (0..cia-ub-recordLength) OPTIONAL,
    aODRecordLength [6] INTEGER (0..cia-ub-recordLength) OPTIONAL
}
```

```
AlgorithmInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
    reference      Reference,
    algorithm       CIO-ALGORITHM.&id({AlgorithmSet}),
    parameters      CIO-ALGORITHM.&Parameters({AlgorithmSet}@algorithm),
    supportedOperations CIO-ALGORITHM.&Operations({AlgorithmSet}@algorithm),
    objId          CIO-ALGORITHM.&objectIdentifier ({AlgorithmSet}@algorithm),
    algRef         Reference OPTIONAL
}
```

```
LastUpdate ::= CHOICE {
    generalizedTime      GeneralizedTime,
    referencedTime       ReferencedValue,
    ... -- For future extensions
}(CONSTRAINED BY {-- The referencedValue shall be of type GeneralizedTime --})
```

```
ProfileIndication ::= CHOICE {
    profileOID      OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
    profileName     UTF8String,
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

EF.CIAInfo shall contain one DER-encoded value of type **CIAInfo**.

The interpretation of the **CIAInfo** type shall be as follows:

- **CIAInfo.version**: This component shall be set to **v2** for this edition of this part of ISO/IEC 7816. Future editions may use other values. A CIAInfo value shall not be rejected solely because it has an unknown version number.

NOTE The version number **v1** is used in the equivalent structure in PKCS #15.

- **CIAInfo.serialNumber**: This component shall contain the CIA's unique serial number, as chosen by the application provider.
- **CIAInfo.manufacturerID**: This optional component shall, when present, contain identifying information about the card manufacturer, UTF-8 encoded.
- **CIAInfo.label**: This optional component shall, when present, contain identifying information about the application.

- **CIAInfo.cardflags**: This component contains information about the card *per se*. Flags include: If the card is read-only, if there are cryptographic functions that require a user to be authenticated, and if the card supports pseudo-random number generation.
 - **CIAInfo.selInfo**: This optional component is intended to convey information about pre-set security environments on the card, and the owner of these environments. The definition of these environments is currently out of scope for this part of ISO/IEC 7816, see further ISO/IEC 7816-4. The **aid** component indicates the (card) application for which the security environment is applicable.
 - **CIAInfo.recordInfo**: This optional component has two purposes:
 - to indicate whether the elementary files EF.OD, EF.PrKD, EF.PuKD, EF.SKD, EF.CD, EF.DCOD and EF.AOD are linear record files or transparent files (if the component is present, they shall be linear record files, otherwise they shall be transparent files); and
 - if they are linear record files, whether they are of fixed-length or not (if they are of fixed length, corresponding values in **RecordInfo** are present and not equal to zero and indicates the record length. If some files are linear record files but not of fixed length, then corresponding values in **RecordInfo** shall be set to zero.
 - **CIAInfo.supportedAlgorithms**: The intent of this optional component is to indicate cryptographic algorithms, associated parameters, operations and algorithm input formats supported by the card. The **reference** component of **AlgorithmInfo** is a unique reference that is used for cross-reference purposes from PrKDs and PuKDs. Values for the **algorithm** component are for private use. Values of the **supportedOperations** component (**compute-checksum**, **compute-signature**, **verify-checksum**, **verify-signature**, **encipher**, **decipher**, **hash** and **derive-key**) identifies operations the card can perform with a particular algorithm. The **objId** component indicates the object identifier for the algorithm. The **algRef** component indicates the identifier used by the card for denoting this algorithm (and, which occurs at the card interface as a parameter of, e.g., an "EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE" command).
- NOTE Values for the **algorithm** component may be chosen from, and interpreted as, mechanism numbers in PKCS #11 (see the bibliography).
- **CIAInfo.issuerId**: This optional component shall, when present, contain identifying information about the card issuer (e.g. the card issuer).
 - **CIAInfo.holderId**: This optional component shall, when present, contain identifying information about the cardholder (e.g. the cardholder).
 - **CIAInfo.lastUpdate**: This optional component shall, when present, contain (or refer to) the date of the last update of files in the CIA. The presence of this component, together with the **CIAInfo.serialNumber** component, will enable host-side applications to quickly find out whether they have to read EF.OD, EF.CD, etc., or if they can use cached copies (if available). The **referencedTime** alternative of the **LastUpdate** type is intended for those cases when EF.CIAInfo needs to be write-protected.
 - **CIAInfo.preferredLanguage**: The preferred language of the cardholder, encoded in accordance with IETF RFC 1766.
 - **CIAInfo.profileIndication**: This optional component shall, when present, indicate profiles of this part of ISO/IEC 7816, which the card has been issued in conformance with.

NOTE It is left to other specifications to define standardized profiles of this part of ISO/IEC 7816.

Annex A (normative)

ASN.1 module

This annex includes all ASN.1 type, value and information object class definitions contained in this part of ISO/IEC 7816, in the form of the ASN.1 module **CryptographicInformationFramework**.

CryptographicInformationFramework {iso(1) standard(0) 7816 15 1}

DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=

BEGIN

IMPORTS

informationFramework, authenticationFramework, certificateExtensions

FROM UsefulDefinitions {joint-iso-itu-t(2) ds(5) module(1) usefulDefinitions(0) 3}

Name

FROM InformationFramework informationFramework

Certificate, AttributeCertificate, CertificateSerialNumber, SubjectPublicKeyInfo, AlgorithmIdentifier, Validity

FROM AuthenticationFramework authenticationFramework

GeneralName, GeneralNames, KeyUsage

FROM CertificateExtensions certificateExtensions

ECPoint, Parameters

FROM ANSI-X9-62 {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-x962(10045) module(4) 1}

DomainParameters

FROM ANSI-X9-42 {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-x942(10046) module(5) 1};

-- A.1 Upper and lower bounds

cia-ub-identifier	INTEGER ::= 255
cia-ub-reference	INTEGER ::= 255
cia-ub-index	INTEGER ::= 65535
cia-ub-label	INTEGER ::= cia-ub-identifier
cia-lb-minPasswordLength	INTEGER ::= 4
cia-ub-minPasswordLength	INTEGER ::= 8
cia-ub-storedPasswordLength	INTEGER ::= 64
cia-ub-recordLength	INTEGER ::= 16383
cia-ub-userConsent	INTEGER ::= 15
cia-ub-securityConditions	INTEGER ::= 255
cia-ub-biometricTypes	INTEGER ::= 127

-- A.2 Basic types

-- A.2.1

Identifier ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE (0..cia-ub-identifier))

-- A.2.2

Reference ::= INTEGER (0..cia-ub-reference)

-- A.2.3

Label ::= UTF8String (SIZE(0..cia-ub-label))

-- A.2.4

CredentialIdentifier {KEY-IDENTIFIER : IdentifierSet} ::= SEQUENCE {
 idType KEY-IDENTIFIER.&id ({IdentifierSet}),
 idValue KEY-IDENTIFIER.&Value ({IdentifierSet}){@idType}
 }

```

KeyIdentifiers KEY-IDENTIFIER ::= {
    issuerAndSerialNumber      |
    issuerAndSerialNumberHash  |
    subjectKeyId               |
    subjectKeyHash              |
    issuerKeyHash               |
    issuerNameHash              |
    subjectNameHash             |
    pgp2KeyId                  |
    openPGPKeyId,              |
    ...                         |
}

KEY-IDENTIFIER ::= CLASS {
    &id INTEGER UNIQUE,
    &Value
} WITH SYNTAX {
    SYNTAX &Value IDENTIFIED BY &id
}

IssuerAndSerialNumber ::= SEQUENCE {
    issuer Name,
    serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber
}

issuerAndSerialNumber KEY-IDENTIFIER ::=
    {SYNTAX IssuerAndSerialNumber IDENTIFIED BY 1}

issuerAndSerialNumberHash KEY-IDENTIFIER ::=
    {SYNTAX OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY 3}
    -- Assumes SHA-1 hash of DER encoding of IssuerAndSerialNumber

subjectKeyId KEY-IDENTIFIER ::=
    {SYNTAX OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY 2}
    -- From ISO/IEC 9594-8:1998 certificate extension

subjectKeyHash KEY-IDENTIFIER ::=
    {SYNTAX OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY 4}

issuerKeyHash KEY-IDENTIFIER ::=
    {SYNTAX OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY 5}

issuerNameHash KEY-IDENTIFIER ::=
    {SYNTAX OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY 6}
    -- SHA-1 hash of DER-encoded issuer name

subjectNameHash KEY-IDENTIFIER ::=
    {SYNTAX OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY 7}
    -- SHA-1 hash of DER-encoded subject name

pgp2KeyId KEY-IDENTIFIER ::=
    {SYNTAX OCTET STRING (SIZE(8)) IDENTIFIED BY 8}

openPGPKeyId KEY-IDENTIFIER ::=
    {SYNTAX OCTET STRING (SIZE(8)) IDENTIFIED BY 9}

-- A.2.5

ReferencedValue ::= CHOICE {
    path      Path,
    url       URL
} -- The syntax of the object is determined by the context

URL ::= CHOICE {
    url      CHOICE {printable PrintableString, ia5 IA5String},
    urlWithDigest [3] SEQUENCE {
        url      IA5String,
        digest    DigestInfoWithDefault
    }
}

```

```

alg-id-sha1 AlgorithmIdentifier ::= {
    algorithm      id-sha1,
    parameters     SHA1Parameters : NULL
}

id-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) 26 }

SHA1Parameters ::= NULL

DigestInfoWithDefault ::= SEQUENCE {
    digestAlg      AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT alg-id-sha1,
    digest         OCTET STRING (SIZE(8..128))
}

Path ::= SEQUENCE {
    efidOrPath     OCTET STRING,
    index          INTEGER (0..cia-ub-index) OPTIONAL,
    length         [0] INTEGER (0..cia-ub-index) OPTIONAL
}{ WITH COMPONENTS {..., index PRESENT, length PRESENT}
  WITH COMPONENTS {..., index ABSENT, length ABSENT}

-- A.2.6

ObjectValue { Type } ::= CHOICE {
    indirect   ReferencedValue,
    direct     [0] Type
}

-- A.2.7

PathOrObjects {ObjectType} ::= CHOICE {
    path       Path,
    objects     [0] SEQUENCE OF ObjectType,
    ... -- For future extensions
}

-- A.2.8

CommonObjectAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    label       Label OPTIONAL,
    flags       CommonObjectFlags OPTIONAL,
    authId      Identifier OPTIONAL,
    userConsent INTEGER (1..cia-ub-userConsent) OPTIONAL,
    accessControlRules SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF AccessControlRule OPTIONAL,
    ... -- For future extensions
} (CONSTRAINED BY {-- authId should be present if flags.private is set.
-- It shall equal an authId in one authentication object in the AOD -- })

CommonObjectFlags ::= BIT STRING {
    private      (0),
    modifiable   (1),
    internal      (2)
} -- Bit (2) is present for historical reasons and shall not be used

AccessControlRule ::= SEQUENCE {
    accessMode     AccessMode,
    securityCondition SecurityCondition,
    ... -- For future extensions
}

AccessMode ::= BIT STRING {
    read      (0),
    update     (1),
    execute    (2),
    delete     (3)
}

```

```

SecurityCondition ::= CHOICE {
    always          NULL,
    authId          Identifier,
    authReference   AuthReference,
    not             [0] SecurityCondition,
    and             [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (2..cia-ub-securityConditions) OF SecurityCondition,
    or             [2] SEQUENCE SIZE (2..cia-ub-securityConditions) OF SecurityCondition,
    ... -- For future extensions
}

```

```

AuthReference ::= SEQUENCE {
    authMethod      AuthMethod,
    seldentifier    INTEGER OPTIONAL
}

```

```

AuthMethod ::= BIT STRING {secureMessaging(0), extAuthentication(1), userAuthentication(2)}

```

-- A.2.9

```

CommonKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    iD              Identifier,
    usage           KeyUsageFlags,
    native          BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE,
    accessFlags     KeyAccessFlags OPTIONAL,
    keyReference    KeyReference OPTIONAL,
    startDate       GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
    endDate        [0] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
    algReference    [1] SEQUENCE OF Reference OPTIONAL,
    ... -- For future extensions
}

```

```

KeyUsageFlags ::= BIT STRING {
    encipher        (0),
    decipher        (1),
    sign            (2),
    signRecover     (3),
    keyEncipher     (4),
    keyDecipher     (5),
    verify          (6),
    verifyRecover   (7),
    derive          (8),
    nonRepudiation  (9)
}

```

```

KeyAccessFlags ::= BIT STRING {
    sensitive        (0),
    extractable      (1),
    alwaysSensitive  (2),
    neverExtractable (3),
    cardGenerated    (4)
}

```

```

KeyReference ::= INTEGER

```

-- A.2.10

```

CommonPrivateKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    name           Name OPTIONAL,
    keyIdentifiers [0] SEQUENCE OF CredentialIdentifier {{KeyIdentifiers}} OPTIONAL,
    generalName    [1] GeneralNames OPTIONAL,
    ... -- For future extensions
}

```

-- A.2.11

```
CommonPublicKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    name          Name OPTIONAL,
    trustedUsage   [0] Usage OPTIONAL,
    generalName    [1] GeneralNames OPTIONAL,
    keyIdentifiers [2] SEQUENCE OF CredentialIdentifier {{KeyIdentifiers}} OPTIONAL,
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

-- A.2.12

```
CommonSecretKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    keyLen  INTEGER OPTIONAL, -- keylength (in bits)
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

-- A.2.13

```
GenericKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    keyType CIO-ALGORITHM.&objectIdentifier {{AllowedAlgorithms}},
    keyAttr CIO-ALGORITHM.&Parameters {{AllowedAlgorithms}}{@keyType}
}
```

AllowedAlgorithms CIO-ALGORITHM ::= {...}

-- A.2.14

```
KeyInfo {ParameterType, OperationsType} ::= CHOICE {
    paramsAndOps SEQUENCE {
        parameters ParameterType,
        operations OperationsType OPTIONAL
    },
    reference Reference -- Historical, not to be used
}
```

-- A.2.15

```
CommonCertificateAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    id          Identifier,
    authority    BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
    identifier    CredentialIdentifier {{KeyIdentifiers}} OPTIONAL,
    certHash     [0] CertHash OPTIONAL,
    trustedUsage [1] Usage OPTIONAL,
    identifiers   [2] SEQUENCE OF CredentialIdentifier {{KeyIdentifiers}} OPTIONAL,
    validity      [4] Validity OPTIONAL,
    ...
} -- Context tag [3] is reserved for historical reasons
```

```
Usage ::= SEQUENCE {
    keyUsage KeyUsage OPTIONAL,
    extKeyUsage SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
    ...
} (WITH COMPONENTS {..., keyUsage PRESENT} | WITH COMPONENTS {..., extKeyUsage PRESENT})
```

```
CertHash ::= SEQUENCE {
    hashAlg [0] EXPLICIT AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
    certId  [1] EXPLICIT CertId OPTIONAL,
    hashVal BIT STRING
} (CONSTRAINED BY {-- hashVal is calculated over the whole DER-encoded certificate --})
```

```
CertId ::= SEQUENCE {
    issuer      GeneralName,
    serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber
}
```

-- A.2.16

```

GenericCertificateAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    certType CIO-OPAQUE.&id ({AllowedCertificates}),
    certAttr CIO-OPAQUE.&Type ({AllowedCertificates}{@certType})
}

```

```

AllowedCertificates CIO-OPAQUE ::= {...}

```

-- A.2.17

```

CommonDataContainerObjectAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    applicationName Label OPTIONAL,
    applicationOID OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
    ID Identifier OPTIONAL,
    ... -- For future extensions
} (WITH COMPONENTS {..., applicationName PRESENT} WITH COMPONENTS {..., applicationOID PRESENT})

```

-- A.2.18

```

CommonAuthenticationObjectAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    authId Identifier OPTIONAL,
    authReference Reference OPTIONAL,
    seldentifier [0] Reference OPTIONAL,
    ... -- For future extensions
}

```

-- A.2.19

```

CIO {ClassAttributes, SubClassAttributes, TypeAttributes} ::= SEQUENCE {
    commonObjectAttributes CommonObjectAttributes,
    classAttributes ClassAttributes,
    subClassAttributes [0] SubClassAttributes OPTIONAL,
    typeAttributes [1] TypeAttributes
}

```

-- A.3 CIOs

```

CIOChoice ::= CHOICE {
    privateKeys [0] PrivateKeys,
    publicKeys [1] PublicKeys,
    trustedPublicKeys [2] PublicKeys,
    secretKeys [3] SecretKeys,
    certificates [4] Certificates,
    trustedCertificates [5] Certificates,
    usefulCertificates [6] Certificates,
    dataContainerObjects [7] DataContainerObjects,
    authObjects [8] AuthObjects,
    ... -- For future extensions
}

```

```

PrivateKeys ::= PathOrObjects {PrivateKeyChoice}

```

```

PublicKeys ::= PathOrObjects {PublicKeyChoice}

```

```

SecretKeys ::= PathOrObjects {SecretKeyChoice}

```

```

Certificates ::= PathOrObjects {CertificateChoice}

```

```

DataContainerObjects ::= PathOrObjects {DataContainerObjectChoice}

```

```

AuthObjects ::= PathOrObjects {AuthenticationObjectChoice}

```

-- A.4 Private key information objects

-- A.4.1

```

PrivateKeyChoice ::= CHOICE {
    privateRSAKey PrivateKeyObject {PrivateKeyAttributes},
    privateECKey [0] PrivateKeyObject {PrivateECKeyAttributes},
    privateDHKey [1] PrivateKeyObject {PrivateDHKeyAttributes},
}

```

```
privateDSAKey      [2] PrivateKeyObject {PrivateKeyAttributes},
privateKEAKey      [3] PrivateKeyObject {PrivateKeyAttributes},
genericPrivateKey  [4] PrivateKeyObject {GenericKeyAttributes},
... -- For future extensions
}
```

```
PrivateKeyObject {KeyAttributes} ::= CIO {
    CommonKeyAttributes, CommonPrivateKeyAttributes, KeyAttributes}
```

-- A.4.2

```
PrivateRSAKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    value      Path,
    modulusLength  INTEGER, -- modulus length in bits, e.g. 1024
    keyInfo    KeyInfo {NULL, PublicKeyOperations} OPTIONAL,
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

-- A.4.3

```
PrivateECKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    value      Path,
    keyInfo    KeyInfo {Parameters, PublicKeyOperations} OPTIONAL,
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

-- A.4.4

```
PrivateDHKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    value      Path,
    keyInfo    KeyInfo {DomainParameters, PublicKeyOperations} OPTIONAL,
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

-- A.4.5

```
PrivateDSAKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    value      Path,
    keyInfo    KeyInfo {DomainParameters, PublicKeyOperations} OPTIONAL,
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

-- A.4.6

```
PrivateKEAKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    value      Path,
    keyInfo    KeyInfo {DomainParameters, PublicKeyOperations} OPTIONAL,
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

-- A.5 Public key information objects

-- A.5.1

```
PublicKeyChoice ::= CHOICE {
    publicRSAKey      PublicKeyObject {PublicRSAKeyAttributes},
    publicECKey       [0] PublicKeyObject {PublicECKeyAttributes},
    publicDHKey       [1] PublicKeyObject {PublicDHKeyAttributes},
    publicDSAKey      [2] PublicKeyObject {PublicDSAKeyAttributes},
    publicKEAKey      [3] PublicKeyObject {PublicKEAKeyAttributes},
    genericPublicKey  [4] PublicKeyObject {GenericKeyAttributes},
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

```
PublicKeyObject {KeyAttributes} ::= CIO {
    CommonKeyAttributes, CommonPublicKeyAttributes, KeyAttributes}
```

-- A.5.2

```

PublicRSAKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    value      ObjectValue {RSAPublicKeyChoice},
    modulusLength  INTEGER, -- modulus length in bits, e.g. 1024
    keyInfo    KeyInfo {NULL, PublicKeyOperations} OPTIONAL,
    ... -- For future extensions
}

```

```

RSAPublicKeyChoice ::= CHOICE {
    raw      RSAPublicKey,
    spki     [1] SubjectPublicKeyInfo, -- See ISO/IEC 9594-8:1998. Must contain a public RSA key.
    ...
}

```

```

RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
    modulus      INTEGER,
    publicExponent  INTEGER
}

```

-- A.5.3

```

PublicECKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    value      ObjectValue {ECPublicKeyChoice},
    keyInfo    KeyInfo {Parameters, PublicKeyOperations} OPTIONAL,
    ... -- For future extensions
}

```

```

ECPublicKeyChoice ::= CHOICE {
    raw      ECPoint, -- See ANSI X9.62,
    spki     SubjectPublicKeyInfo, -- See ISO/IEC 9594-8:1998. Must contain a public elliptic curve key
    ...
}

```

-- A.5.4

```

PublicDHKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    value      ObjectValue {DHPublicKeyChoice},
    keyInfo    KeyInfo {DomainParameters, PublicKeyOperations} OPTIONAL,
    ... -- For future extensions
}

```

```

DHPublicKeyChoice ::= CHOICE {
    raw      DHPublicNumber,
    spki     SubjectPublicKeyInfo, -- See ISO/IEC 9594-8:1998. Must contain a public D-H key.
    ...
}

```

```

DHPublicNumber ::= INTEGER

```

-- A.5.5

```

PublicDSAKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    value      ObjectValue {DSAPublicKeyChoice},
    keyInfo    KeyInfo {DomainParameters, PublicKeyOperations} OPTIONAL,
    ... -- For future extensions
}

```

```

DSAPublicKeyChoice ::= CHOICE {
    raw      DSAPublicKey,
    spki     SubjectPublicKeyInfo, -- See ISO/IEC 9594-8:1998. Must contain a public DSA key.
    ...
}

```

```

DSAPublicKey ::= INTEGER

```

-- A.5.6

```
PublicKEAKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    value      ObjectValue {KEAPublicKeyChoice},
    keyInfo    KeyInfo {DomainParameters, PublicKeyOperations} OPTIONAL,
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

```
KEAPublicKeyChoice ::= CHOICE {
    raw        KEAPublicKey,
    spki       SubjectPublicKeyInfo, -- See ISO/IEC 9594-8:1998. Must contain a public KEA key.
    ...
}
```

KEAPublicKey ::= INTEGER

-- A.6 Secret key information objects

-- A.6.1

```
SecretKeyChoice ::= CHOICE {
    algIndependentKey SecretKeyObject {SecretKeyAttributes},
    genericSecretKey   [15] SecretKeyObject {GenericKeyAttributes},
    ... -- For future extensions
} -- Note: Context tags [0] – [14] historical and not to be used
```

```
SecretKeyObject {KeyAttributes} ::= CIO {
    CommonKeyAttributes, CommonSecretKeyAttributes, KeyAttributes}
```

-- A.6.2

```
SecretKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    value      ObjectValue { OCTET STRING },
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

-- A.7 Certificate information objects

-- A.7.1

```
CertificateChoice ::= CHOICE {
    x509Certificate           CertificateObject {X509CertificateAttributes},
    x509AttributeCertificate [0] CertificateObject {X509AttributeCertificateAttributes},
    spkiCertificate           [1] CertificateObject {SPKICertificateAttributes},
    pgpCertificate            [2] CertificateObject {PGPCertificateAttributes},
    wtlsCertificate           [3] CertificateObject {WTLSCertificateAttributes},
    x9-68Certificate          [4] CertificateObject {X9-68CertificateAttributes},
    cvCertificate             [5] CertificateObject {CVCertificateAttributes},
    genericCertificateObject [6] CertificateObject {GenericCertificateAttributes},
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

```
CertificateObject {CertAttributes} ::= CIO {
    CommonCertificateAttributes, NULL, CertAttributes}
```

-- A.7.2

```
X509CertificateAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    value      ObjectValue { Certificate },
    subject    Name OPTIONAL,
    issuer      [0] Name OPTIONAL,
    serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber OPTIONAL,
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

-- A.7.3

```
X509AttributeCertificateAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    value      ObjectValue { AttributeCertificate },
    issuer      GeneralNames OPTIONAL,
    serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber OPTIONAL,
    attrTypes   [0] SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

-- A.7.4

```
SPKICertificateAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    value      ObjectValue { CIO-OPAQUE.&Type },
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

-- A.7.5

```
PGPCertificateAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    value      ObjectValue { CIO-OPAQUE.&Type },
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

-- A.7.6

```
WTLSCertificateAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    value      ObjectValue { CIO-OPAQUE.&Type },
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

-- A.7.7

```
X9-68CertificateAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    value      ObjectValue { CIO-OPAQUE.&Type },
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

-- A.7.8

```
CVCertificateAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    value      ObjectValue { CIO-OPAQUE.&Type },
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

-- A.8 Data container information objects

-- A.8.1

```
DataContainerObjectChoice ::= CHOICE {
    opaqueDO      DataContainerObject {OpaqueDOAttributes},
    iso7816DO     [0] DataContainerObject {ISO7816DOAttributes},
    oidDO         [1] DataContainerObject {OidDOAttributes},
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

```
DataContainerObject {DataObjectAttributes} ::= CIO {
    CommonDataContainerObjectAttributes, NULL, DataObjectAttributes}
```

-- A.8.2

```
OpaqueDOAttributes ::= ObjectValue {CIO-OPAQUE.&Type}
```

-- A.8.3

```
ISO7816DOAttributes ::= ObjectValue {CIO-OPAQUE.&Type}
(CONSTRAINED BY {-- All such data container objects shall be defined in accordance with ISO/IEC 7816-4 --})
```

-- A.8.4

```
OidDOAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    id      CIO-OPAQUE.&id ({AllowedOidDOs}),
    value   CIO-OPAQUE.&Type ({AllowedOidDOs}{@id})
}
```

```
AllowedOidDOs CIO-OPAQUE ::= {...}
```

-- A.9 Authentication information objects

-- A.9.1

```
AuthenticationObjectChoice ::= CHOICE {
    pwd                AuthenticationObject { PasswordAttributes },
    biometricTemplate  [0] AuthenticationObject { BiometricAttributes},
    authKey            [1] AuthenticationObject { AuthKeyAttributes},
    external           [2] AuthenticationObject { ExternalAuthObjectAttributes},
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

```
AuthenticationObject {AuthObjectAttributes} ::= CIO {
    CommonAuthenticationObjectAttributes, NULL, AuthObjectAttributes}
```

-- A.9.2

```
PasswordAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    pwdFlags           PasswordFlags,
    pwdType            PasswordType,
    minLength          INTEGER (cia-lb-minPasswordLength..cia-ub-minPasswordLength),
    storedLength       INTEGER (0..cia-ub-storedPasswordLength),
    maxLength          INTEGER OPTIONAL,
    pwdReference       [0] Reference DEFAULT 0,
    padChar            OCTET STRING (SIZE(1)) OPTIONAL,
    lastPasswordChangeGeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
    path              Path OPTIONAL,
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

```
PasswordFlags ::= BIT STRING {
    case-sensitive      (0),
    local              (1),
    change-disabled     (2),
    unblock-disabled    (3),
    initialized         (4),
    needs-padding       (5),
    unblockingPassword  (6),
    soPassword          (7),
    disable-allowed     (8),
    integrity-protected (9),
    confidentiality-protected (10),
    exchangeRefData     (11)
} (CONSTRAINED BY { -- 'unblockingPassword' and 'soPassword' cannot both be set -- })
```

```
PasswordType ::= ENUMERATED {bcd, ascii-numeric, utf8, half-nibble-bcd, iso9564-1, ...}
```

-- A.9.3

```
BiometricAttributes ::= CHOICE {
    biometricTemplateAttributes BiometricTemplateAttributes,
    bit                        [APPLICATION 96] BiometricInformationTemplate,
    bitGroup                  [APPLICATION 97] BiometricInformationTemplateGroup
}
```

BiometricInformationTemplate ::= OCTET STRING -- Shall contain an ISO/IEC 7816-11 BIT value

BiometricInformationTemplateGroup ::= OCTET STRING
-- Shall contain an ISO/IEC 7816-11 BIT group template value

```
BiometricTemplateAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    bioFlags           BiometricFlags,
    templateId         BiometricTemplateIdentifier,
    bioType            BiometricType,
    bioReference       Reference DEFAULT 0,
    lastChange         GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
    path              Path OPTIONAL,
    ... -- For future extensions
}
```

```

BiometricTemplateIdentifier ::= CHOICE {
    oid      OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
    issuerId OCTET STRING,
    ... -- For future extensions
}

```

```

BiometricFlags ::= BIT STRING {
    local                (1),
    change-disabled     (2),
    unblock-disabled    (3),
    initialized         (4),
    disable-allowed     (8),
    integrity-protected (9),
    confidentiality-protected (10)
}

```

```

BiometricType ::= CHOICE {
    fingerPrint    FingerPrintInformation,
    iris           [0] IrisInformation,
    chained [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (2..cia-ub-biometricTypes) OF BiometricType,
    ... -- For future extensions
}

```

```

FingerPrintInformation ::= SEQUENCE {
    hand      ENUMERATED {left, right},
    finger    ENUMERATED {thumb, pointerFinger, middleFinger, ringFinger, littleFinger}
}

```

```

IrisInformation ::= SEQUENCE {
    eye      ENUMERATED {left, right},
    ... -- For future extensions
}

```

-- A.9.4

```

ExternalAuthObjectAttributes ::= CHOICE {
    authKeyAttributes  AuthKeyAttributes,
    certBasedAttributes [0] CertBasedAuthenticationAttributes,
    ... -- For future extensions
}

```

```

AuthKeyAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    derivedKey    BOOLEAN DEFAULT TRUE,
    authKeyId     Identifier,
    ... -- For future extensions
}

```

```

CertBasedAuthenticationAttributes ::= SEQUENCE {
    cha      OCTET STRING,
    ... -- For future extensions
}

```

-- A.10 Cryptographic and card information

```

CIAInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
    version                INTEGER {v1(0),v2(1)} (v1|v2,...),
    serialNumber           OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
    manufacturerID        Label OPTIONAL,
    label                  [0] Label OPTIONAL,
    cardflags              CardFlags,
    selInfo                SEQUENCE OF SecurityEnvironmentInfo OPTIONAL,
    recordInfo             [1] RecordInfo OPTIONAL,
    supportedAlgorithms    [2] SEQUENCE OF AlgorithmInfo OPTIONAL,
    issuerId               [3] Label OPTIONAL,
    holderId               [4] Label OPTIONAL,
    lastUpdate             [5] LastUpdate OPTIONAL,
    preferredLanguage      PrintableString OPTIONAL, -- In accordance with IETF RFC 1766
    profileIndication      [6] SEQUENCE OF ProfileIndication OPTIONAL,
    ...
}

```

} (CONSTRAINED BY { -- Each AlgorithmInfo.reference value shall be unique --})

CardFlags ::= BIT STRING {
 readonly (0),
 authRequired (1),
 prnGeneration (2)
 } -- Bit (3) is reserved for historical reasons

SecurityEnvironmentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
 se INTEGER,
 owner OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
 aid OCTET STRING
 (CONSTRAINED BY {-- Must be encoded in accordance with ISO/IEC 7816-4 --}) OPTIONAL,
 ... -- For future extensions
 }

RecordInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
 oDRecordLength [0] INTEGER (0..cia-ub-recordLength) OPTIONAL,
 prKDRecordLength [1] INTEGER (0..cia-ub-recordLength) OPTIONAL,
 puKDRecordLength [2] INTEGER (0..cia-ub-recordLength) OPTIONAL,
 sKDRecordLength [3] INTEGER (0..cia-ub-recordLength) OPTIONAL,
 cDRecordLength [4] INTEGER (0..cia-ub-recordLength) OPTIONAL,
 dCODRecordLength [5] INTEGER (0..cia-ub-recordLength) OPTIONAL,
 aODRecordLength [6] INTEGER (0..cia-ub-recordLength) OPTIONAL
 }

AlgorithmInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
 reference Reference,
 algorithm CIO-ALGORITHM.&id({AlgorithmSet}),
 parameters CIO-ALGORITHM.&Parameters({AlgorithmSet}{@algorithm}),
 supportedOperations CIO-ALGORITHM.&Operations({AlgorithmSet}{@algorithm}),
 objId CIO-ALGORITHM.&objectIdentifier ({AlgorithmSet}{@algorithm}),
 algRef Reference OPTIONAL
 }

CIO-ALGORITHM ::= CLASS {
 &id INTEGER UNIQUE,
 &Parameters,
 &Operations Operations,
 &objectIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL
 } WITH SYNTAX {
 PARAMETERS &Parameters OPERATIONS &Operations ID &id [OID &objectIdentifier]
 }

CIO-OPAQUE ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER

PublicKeyOperations ::= Operations

Operations ::= BIT STRING {
 compute-checksum (0), -- H/W computation of checksum
 compute-signature (1), -- H/W computation of signature
 verify-checksum (2), -- H/W verification of checksum
 verify-signature (3), -- H/W verification of signature
 encipher (4), -- H/W encryption of data
 decipher (5), -- H/W decryption of data
 hash (6), -- H/W hashing
 generate-key (7) -- H/W key generation
 }

cia-alg-null CIO-ALGORITHM ::= {
 PARAMETERS NULL OPERATIONS {{generate-key}} ID -1}

AlgorithmSet CIO-ALGORITHM ::= {
 cia-alg-null,
 ... -- See PKCS #11 for possible values for the &id component (and parameters)
 }

```

LastUpdate ::= CHOICE {
    generalizedTime    GeneralizedTime,
    referencedTime     ReferencedValue ,
    ... -- For future extensions
}(CONSTRAINED BY {-- The value for referencedTime shall be of type GeneralizedTime --})

ProfileIndication ::= CHOICE {
    profileOID        OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
    profileName       UTF8String,
    ... -- For future extensions
}

-- A.11 CIO DDO
CIODDO ::= SEQUENCE {
    providerId        OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
    odfPath           Path OPTIONAL,
    cialInfoPath [0] Path OPTIONAL,
    aid              [APPLICATION 15] OCTET STRING
                    (CONSTRAINED BY {-- Must be an AID in accordance with ISO/IEC 7816-4--}) OPTIONAL,
    ... -- For future extensions
} -- Context tag 1 is historical and shall not be used

END

```

Annex B (informative)

CIA example for cards with digital signature and authentication functionality

B.1 Introduction

This annex describes an example of the CIA suitable for electronic identification purposes and requirements for it. The example includes requirements both for cards and for host-side applications making use of cards.

B.2 CIOs

- Private Keys: A CIO card should contain at least two private keys, of which one should be used for digital signature purposes only (key usage flags: any combination of **sign**, **signRecover**, and **nonRepudiation**). At least one of the other keys should be possible to use for client/server authentication and have the value **sign** and/or **decipher** set in its key usage flags. Authentication CDEs or encipherment shall protect all private keys. Usage of the signature-only key should require cardholder verification with an authentication CDE used only for this key. The key length shall be sufficient for intended purposes.

Private key types for this example are: RSA keys, Elliptic Curve keys (this example places no restrictions on the domain parameters other than the ones mentioned above); and DSA keys.

- Secret Keys: CDEs of this type may or may not be present on the card, depending on the application provider's discretion. There is no requirement for host-side applications to handle these keys.
- Public Keys: CDEs of this type may or may not be present on the card, depending on the application provider's discretion. There is no requirement for host-side applications to handle these keys.
- Certificates: For each private key at least one corresponding certificate should be stored in the card. The certificates shall be of type **X509Certificate**. If an application provider stores CA certificates on a card which supports the ISO/IEC 7816-4 logical file organization, and which has suitable file access mechanisms, then it is recommended that they are stored in a protected file. This file shall be pointed to by a CD file which is only modifiable by the card issuer (or not modifiable at all). This implies usage of the **trustedCertificates** choice in the **CIOChoice** type.
- Data container objects: CDEs of this type may or may not be present on the card, depending on the application provider's discretion. There is no requirement for host-side applications to handle these objects.
- Authentication objects: At least one authentication CDE shall be present on the card, controlling access to protected CDEs. A separate authentication CDE should be used for the signature-only key, if such a key exist. Any use of the signature-only private key should require a new user authentication. In the case of passwords, any positive verification of one password shall not enable the use of security services associated with another password.

Passwords shall be at least 4 characters (BCD, UTF-8 or ASCII) long.

When a password is blocked after consecutive incorrect password verifications, the password may only be unblocked through a resetting code or a special unblocking procedure, defined by the card issuer.




Figure B.1 — File relationships in DF.CIA. Dashed arrows indicate cross-references

B.3 Access control

Private keys shall be private objects, and should be marked as **sensitive**. Files, which contain private keys, should be protected against removal and/or overwriting. The following access conditions shall be set for DF.CIA and elementary files in it.

Table B.1 — Recommended file access conditions

File	Access Conditions
DF.CIA	Create: User authentication or External authentication Delete: External authentication
EF.CIAInfo	Read: Always Update: User authentication or External authentication or Never Append: Never
EF.OD	Read: Always Update: External authentication Append: External authentication
EF.AOD	Read: Always Update: Never Append: User authentication or External authentication
EF.PrKD, EF.PuKD, EF.SKD, EF.CD and EF.DCOD	Read: Always or User authentication Update: User authentication or External authentication or Never Append: User authentication or External authentication or Never
EF.CD containing references to trusted certificates	Read: Always Update: External authentication or Never Append: External authentication or Never
Other EFs in DF.CIA	Read: Always or User authentication Update: User authentication or External authentication or Never Append: User authentication or External authentication or Never
NOTE 1	External authentication is described in ISO/IEC 7816-4.
NOTE 2	External authentication should include secure messaging as described in ISO/IEC 7816-4.

NOTE If an application provider wants to protect a CIO directory file with an authentication object, then by default the first authentication object in EF.AOD shall be used. Obviously, EF.OD and EF.AOD cannot be protected in this manner.

Annex C (informative)

Example topologies




Figure C.1 — Example with three applications. Cryptographic data elements are stored outside the CIA





Figure C.2 — Example with three applications. Only EF.OD and EF.CIAInfo in DF.CIA

**Figure C.3 — Example of usage of EF.DIR**